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 1 
Introduction 
International criminal jurisdiction is a scion of hundreds of years of wars and 
international institutionalization. Drafted to fulfil the purpose of bringing justice, 
especially to the perpetrators of crimes that are part of a bigger plan or show 
systematics; hanging the little ones and letting the big ones run shall no longer be the 
brutal reality in large-scale1 conflicts. Rather, war is declared on impunity that has 
been put before justice on any number of occasions in the global history. 
Experts on the law of nations seem to doubt the effectiveness of the introduction of 
criminal law into the international area to the same extent as experts on criminal law 
question the law of nations as an assertive legal order.2  International Criminal Law is 
instructed in the field of the law of nations and as such is exposed to political strategy 
and will, and for a large part dependant on these conditions to exist in order to 
function. Set up with the goal to build, keep or promote peace by neutralizing former 
offenses, these dependencies construct a very difficult net of politics and law, torn 
between the goal to achieve peace and justice without trading one for the other. 
The strive for peace connects societies all over the world as possibly the only true 
universal value; numerous international organisations, research institutes, NGOs and 
individuals make it their daily business. Centuries of war led to the establishment of 
the national state as the transitional climax of intrastate peace; the same credo is 
leading the international community in its search for ways to establish global peace. 
In an increasingly institutionalized world, the United Nations was erected as the most 
ambitious project dedicated to this purpose. 
The upsurge of the human rights in a globalized medial world allowing proceedings to 
be watched everywhere led to the establishment of the belief that certain values 
deserve protection. Global courts were errected for that purpose: the protection of 
humanity. 
                                            
1 The ICC’s jurisdiction will span over four statutory offenses that will be further described in the 
following chapters. Large-scale crimes and macro-crimes will be used as shorter expressions when 
bearing on these crimes. 
2 Ambos, "Zur Bestrafung Von Verbrechen Im Internationalen, Nicht-Internationalen Und Internen 
Konflikt," Humanitäres Völkerrecht. Politische, Rechtliche Und Strafgerichtliche Dimensionen, eds. 
Jana Hasse, Erwin Müller and Patricia Schneider, Demokratie, Sicherheit, Frieden (Baden-Baden: 
Nomos, 2001). p. 325. 
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The International Criminal Court is the latest accomplishment and most far-reaching 
institution among these courts. Its foundation was accompanied by broad global 
discussions scrutinising its desirability and efficacy and recent developments 
continue to stir these debates.  
The aim of this thesis is to clarify whether, based on the Statute of Rome, an 
independent, impartial and effectively working criminal court has been established or 
whether this has been prevented by the political compromises made. What are the 
reasons for the US refusal to cooperate with the ICC? Further: Through which 
mechanisms of action can peace be established by means of the tool of international 
criminal justice? And, above all, can peace be established in such a manner? 
Research will be  conducted based on the following hypotheses:  
- In theory, peace can be established through international criminal 
prosecution. 
- De facto, peacekeeping absolutely requires voluntary cooperation. 
- The peacekeeping effect is subordinate to certain conditions, according to 
whether or not these are given, effects are triggered, through the 
interaction of which peace can be ensured, created or promoted. 
- Due to the multitude of complex conditions, the pacifying effect stays below 
its possible optimum. 
International Criminal Courts have been discussed for over fifty years, the 
groundwork to their foundation goes back double this time. It took several macro-
crimes and two World Wars to burn images into the world conscience that provoked 
reactions. After long years of political zigzag the ICC was founded as what many 
viewed as the natural consequence of this process. 
In many views, an enormous goal is achieved. Over 100 states, among them 
Western and many powerful nations have agreed to give up on a certain amount of 
sovereignty in strive for a greater goal. This constitutes a turnaround in international 
relations, a remarkable step away from Hobbesian thinking and the Westphalian 
notion of states. 
The true challenges, however, lie ahead. In the Statute of Rome, a treaty based on 
compromise between its states-parties, peppered with controversial issues that 
guarantee the persistence of political strategy pursued within the framework of the 
Court. 
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The asymmetry in the international system has been preserved in the context of the 
Court, universality turned out to be beyond reach and the West, setting the tone in 
international relations, faces the problem of having lost its strongest flagship and only 
superpower midway between the negotiations.  
Besides the fact that two world views are clashing and the American politics as single 
superpower aims at a different method of international conflict solving – there are de 
facto matters constituting the working basis of the ICC that the US carps at: The role 
of the Security Council, a vexed issue reflecting the power dynamics of the involved 
states, as well the possibility of third-party-jurisdiction through the UN and the debate 
on the status of peacekeeping troops. 
The Treaty of Rome was built on consent and strong moral implications that, so the  
criticism suggests, considerations of de facto implementation strategies and 
enforcement have fallen prey to. The model of cooperation underlying the ICC is 
unlikely to suffice at providing effective enforcement. The principle of 
complementarity, on the basis of which the ICC initiates investigations, gives some 
indications of where and following which crimes we will witness processes – and 
where not, even if to do so would be strongly recommendable. 
The belief in the peacekeeping virtue of international criminal jurisdiction lays out a 
set of mechanisms of action that arise from prosecution and lay the groundwork for 
future peace. By individualizing guilt, the blame is taken off the collective; the basis 
for future peaceful coexistence is provided for. The amount of guilt that is hereby 
pressed on the shoulders of individuals in many cases represents a selection of 
chosen culprits that are sacrificed for the greater good. 
The same trail of thought leads the debate on amnesties: applied in order to enable a 
peaceful transition process, they grant impunity and thus the very same case the ICC 
and his predecessors proposed to abolish is tolerated. 
To create a basis for reconciliation, the closure of the cycle of retaliation is vital: To 
effectively impose decisions that the litigant camps will respect, the Court’s reputation 
has to be that of an independent, unbiased institution dedicated to justice and 
fairness. The political implications in the Court’s proceedings can thwart this esteem. 
As a possibly feasible alternative, truth commissions are contemplated in brief. 
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The scope of this thesis will thus lie on the endogenous factors within the ICC; the 
regulations in the Statute with special attention to the implications arising from them. 
On several occasions conclusions drawn from the work of the ICTY and ICTR will be 
consulted in order to prognosticate scenarios for the ICC. Of the cases the ICC is 
currently administering, the indictment of Sudan’s president al-Bashir will serve as a 
paradigm to illustrate the theoretical problems come to life. 
Outer factors taken into account are the international community with special 
attention given to the situation arising through the limited cooperation the USA is 
granting the ICC. It is intended to depict the main prospective problems and 
dilemmas that can be expected to occur.  
Numerous sources were revised in order to answer the research questions and 
confirm the hypotheses. A tremendous amount of books and collected editions reflect 
the scientific attention the topic of international criminal jurisdiction enjoys in manifold 
branches of sciences. Many of them were written by people very directly involved in 
either the ICTY, ICTR or the ICC. Some ooze the enthusiasm with which the 
progress that has been made is regarded, others draw a completely pessimist picture 
regarding the de facto possibilities international criminal courts possess apart from 
those existing in name only. UN Documents, Conventions and Agreements were 
used as well as newspaper articles, since they represent the best source for ongoing 
procedures and developments around the ICC. Further, reports of former prosecutor 
Carla del Ponte were very helpful in order to understand the complex ties with 
governments, state’s interests and the limits to justice. The selected literature was 
chosen with the aim to consult as many different sources as possible so as to be able 
to reflect a well-documented and objective treatise. 
1 Peace in the International Relations 
1.1 Theoretical Groundwork  
In the question of international justice, much progress has been made over the past 
fifty years. The establishment of two ad hoc tribunals doesn’t suffice, of course, in 
order to claim that macro-crimes have been brought to justice, but their installation 
still accounts for a symbol that changes have been coming along. However, studying 
the work of the tribunals and problems they faced, it becomes very obvious that the 
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states in the international arena are still reluctant to let themselves be bound by 
international norms. Many approve of international criminal jurisdiction, but are 
unwilling to grant support beyond what is useful and beneficial for themselves. To 
stick to rules that apply equally to all states and accept restrictrions to sovereignty 
has raised resistance that continuously undermines the efforts of international 
criminal justice. 
In order to lay out these processes, the main theoretical frameworks that guide 
states’ approach to international criminal jurisdiciton will be sketched out on the 
following pages. The views on international relations can be subdivided into typically 
characteristic ideals: anarchical and consensual.3 Idealist, realist, institutionalist, and 
constructivist theories will serve to explain the complex background that the theses 
are placed in. A pluralist approach is more suited to the complex aspirations posed in 
international criminal law and for the sake of clarity the theories shall be outlined 
characteristically.4 
1.1.1 Idealist Theory 
In the early phase of political theory, the idea of establishing and maintaining peace 
was prevalent. Idealism suggested the protection of peace through the establishment 
of international organisations and through diplomatic and legal efforts.5 
Idealist theory regards the events of the latter half of the past century as the origin of 
a new political culture that bases its values on the prevention of violence and on 
team play.6 Wendt calls this culture ‚the Kantian culture.’ Security is not deduced 
from a superior Leviathan, but from confidence in shared common intentions for 
peace. This kind of pluralistic security community that comes into existence 
condemns violence as a legitimate form of dispute settlement.7 In other words, it 
                                            
3 Bassiouni, Introduction to International Criminal Law (Ardsley, New York: Transnational Publishers, 
2003). p. 33. 
4 Schneider, Internationale Gerichtsbarkeit Als Instrument Friedlicher Streitbeilegung. Von Einer 
Empirisch Fundierten Theorie Zu Einem Innovativen Konzept, Demokratie, Sicherheit, Frieden, ed. 
Dieter S. Lutz, vol. 154 (Hamburg: Nomos, 2002). p. 142-145. 
5 Lemke, Internationale Beziehungen. Grundkonzepte, Theorien Und Problemfelder (München  
Wien: Oldenburg Verlag, 2008). p. 14. 
6 Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). p. 
297. 
7 An example for this kind of security community is the USA’s relationship to Canada: Even over 
conflicts that are hard to resolve, applying military force is not an option, although it would be a piece 
of cake for the US to picket its military supremacy in order to let their interests prevail. A pluralistic 
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takes the Lockean culture to the next level: Lockean culture interdicts killing each 
other, Kantian forbids even attacking. To achieve this cooperation in a pluralistic 
security community, it seems necessary to be confronted with problems that are not 
solvable on the national level; fear of environmental collapse and the threat resulting 
from nuclear weapons and similar scenarios are often used to illustrate this. Kantian 
culture further requires internalization to a certain degree, meaning that following the 
rules of the entity and sticking to their own agenda are equal. Cooperation, though, 
still reflects a strategic decision designed to fit their own purposes. 
1.1.2 Realist Theory 
Realist approach to international relations is very prominent and dominates the 
conduction and understanding of this sphere. Being the ruling tradition, all other 
theories are defined by demarcating from it.8 Realist theory regards the international 
relations as a system of anarchy in which every player strives to survive.9 In the 
anarchical view, states coexist in a Hobbesian world: pursuing one’s own interests 
with regard to fitness for purpose.10 States are the main players on the international 
level, they act upon rational thought by attempting to achieve the maximum goal 
attainment with the ressources to their disposition.11 Insecurity leads the states to 
strive for accumulation of power, which constitutes the uttermost goal.12 Protecting 
powers or sanctioning ones are missing. “Hostage to an international environment 
made threatening by the aggressive urges intrinsic to human nature and by the 
absence of any effective protecting world government, states seek, by maintaining or 
augmenting their power, to protect their national interest, which means, first and 
foremost, their independence.”13 
                                            
security community is further distinguishable from collective security systems in that the latter is based 
on mutual security interests within a specified group of allies. For more on this, see Wendt, 1999. 
Ibid. p. 300. 
8 Krell, Weltbilder Und Weltordnung. Einführung in Die Theorie Der Internationalen Beziehungen 
(Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2000). p. 99, 100. 
9 Schneider, Internationale Gerichtsbarkeit Als Instrument Friedlicher Streitbeilegung. Von Einer 
Empirisch Fundierten Theorie Zu Einem Innovativen Konzept. p. 146. 
10 Bassiouni, Introduction to International Criminal Law. p. 33f. 
11 Masala, Kenneth N. Waltz. Einführung in Seine Theorie Und Auseinandersetzung Mit Seinen 
Kritikern (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2005). p. 73f. 
12 Schneider, Internationale Gerichtsbarkeit Als Instrument Friedlicher Streitbeilegung. Von Einer 
Empirisch Fundierten Theorie Zu Einem Innovativen Konzept.p. 146. 
13 Clinton, The Two Faces of National Interest (Baton Rouge and London: Louisiana State University 
Press, 1994). P. 32. 
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The minimum goal constitutes securing one’s livelihood.14 Definition of the self is 
made over power. Every state is a potential enemy, no superior regulatory entity is 
given. Cooperation between states is an option only so far as it serves the own 
interests. The same is true for international law.  
Security is necessary and achievable through power and the own position in the state 
hierarchy has to be upheld. The result is a security dilemma: The arms race leads to 
a vicious cycle of accumulation of power out of a desire for security that again leads 
to loss of security as a natural consequence, that is not intended, but inevitable. The 
arms race is rooted in a desire for safety and as such a defensive policy, but leads to 
a comparable arms race of other realist states. Its original intention is to prevent war, 
but the strategy to that is by deterrence and military supremacy. This spiral can be 
continued ad infinitum.15 
Force is the last resort which is anon not regulated by moral considerations, and 
moreover legal restrictions apply only as far as favoured. This stringently leads to 
chaos and conflict, assuming there exists no balance of power like it did during the 
Cold War.16 International criminal justice is only regarded as an option, as long as it 
doesn’t collide with other interests or, even more so, if it helps to advance these 
interests. If that is not the case, it is shunt to give way to more important interests. 
Critics comment on realist theory by remarking that states’ actual possibilities 
emcompass a much broader spectrum than those factored into the realist theory. 
Clinton annotates that „the multitudinous objectives of states cannot fit the 
Procrustean bed of a single goal – power – into which this last definition of national 
interest tries to force them; no matter how elegant the theory, a messy world refuses 
to be bound by it.”17 Czempiel regards the security dilemma as primary cause for 
violence, followed by the anarchy in the system of the international relations. Uneven 
distribution of power leads to the emergence of a hegemonial power that can 
                                            
14 Masala, Kenneth N. Waltz. Einführung in Seine Theorie Und Auseinandersetzung Mit Seinen 
Kritikern. p. 73f. 
15 Schneider, Internationale Gerichtsbarkeit Als Instrument Friedlicher Streitbeilegung. Von Einer 
Empirisch Fundierten Theorie Zu Einem Innovativen Konzept. p. 145-146. 
16 Bassiouni, Introduction to International Criminal Law. p. 34. 
17 Clinton, The Two Faces of National Interest. P. 33. 
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guarantee stability for a certain period of time. On the long run, however, the 
subordinated actors will strive to free themselves from dependence.18  
1.1.3 Institutionalist Theory 
Institutionalists assume the world is regulated. The will and capacity to overcome 
difficulties in cooperation is given. The social costs of this regulation of the world 
produces smaller expenses on social costs. Common institutions such as the UN and 
international law build the common framework. The interdependence among states 
leads them to strive for an entity to manage global governance. Still, for cooperation 
to be carried out, enticements are conditional. Individual rationality and collective 
rationality cannot be equated. Through institutionalized cooperation secure 
expectations emerge: All states believe that all states will stick to the rules of the 
collective rationality. Through principles, norms, provisons and processes, regimes 
institutionalize cooperation among states. This includes the application of law and 
mechanisms of dispute resolution. Juridification is of high priority. The results 
achieved by institutionalizing the international level are higher and produce less costs 
than in an anarchic world.19 Regulations in the international arena engender lucidity 
and thus contribute to the reduction of violence.20 
Intertwining and interdependence among the actors in this system is intense as 
several actors are connected through international institutions. Institutionalists 
believe that cooperation is the better option when pursuing one’s own interests. 
Common global problems affecting all states are addressed and solved in a jointly 
fashion.21 For their perceived neglectance of the impacts of power that is designated 
to expose naivity, institutionalist assumptions earn criticism from the other schools of 
thought.22 
                                            
18 Czempiel, Kluge Macht - Außenpolitik Für Das 21. Jahrhundert (München: Verlag C.H. Beck, 1999). 
p. 123-124. 
19 Schneider, Internationale Gerichtsbarkeit Als Instrument Friedlicher Streitbeilegung. Von Einer 
Empirisch Fundierten Theorie Zu Einem Innovativen Konzept. p. 146. 
20 Czempiel, Friedensstrategien. Eine Systematische Darstellung Außenpolitischer Theorien Von 
Macchiavelli Bis Madariaga (Opladen/Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher Verlag GmbH, 1998). p. 101. 
21 Lemke, Internationale Beziehungen. Grundkonzepte, Theorien Und Problemfelder. p. 21-22. 
22 Keohane, After Hegemony. Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton and 
Oxford: Princeton University Press, 1984). p. 7. 
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1.1.4 Constructivist Theory  
Constructivist theory regards the system of international relations as a social 
construction. Deduced from constructivist learning theory, it is often described as not 
quite a theory, but rather a general research model applicable to the processing of 
acquired knowledge and its impact. 
The constructivist appraoch claims that society shapes individuals. Taken to the 
international level, assuming that states are the individuals, every state is largely to 
itself, choosing the extent of interference with others purely on considerations of 
materialism, as elaborated above in the international relations theory mainly 
characterized by realist thought. But there is also a history of constructivist thought 
on international relations that underwent an upsurge particularly after the end of the 
Cold War which had left a chasm that prepared the ground for alternative theories. 
The inability of the realist approach to serve explanations for it suggested that there 
might be more to international relations than realist theory suggested there was.23  
The idea of social learning playing an important part in the international system was 
revived. „At home states are bound by a thick strucuture of rules that holds their 
power accountable to society. Abroad they are bound by a different set of rules, the 
logic, ar as I shall argue, logics, of anarchy.“24 Wendt deduces this from the 
‚international institution of sovereignty’, which, as long as it prevails, will maintain the 
international system in this state. According to Wendt, „distributions of ideas are 
social structures.“25 Shared ideas are the part of social structure reputed as culture, 
that form the structure of a system of anarchy. Institutions exist because actors 
create them and fill them with norms.26 
Constructivist thought challenges mostly the neorealist approach, that has dominated 
the scene down to the present day. Neorealist thought defines international relations 
as static, which also affects the role attributed to international institutions that is being 
isolated by the neorealist understanding of power. Constructivists challenge the 
assumption of existing universal laws of global politics that are driven by the reality of 
                                            
23 Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics. p. 3. 
24 Ibid. p. 13. 
25 Ibid. p. 309. 
26 Lemke, Internationale Beziehungen. Grundkonzepte, Theorien Und Problemfelder. p. 36. 
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structures and function independently of time and space.27 The security dilemma that 
is claimed inevitable by neorealists is a variable constituted by politics and is thus 
reducible in size, if cooperation in the international system replaces anarchy.28  
Constructivists believe „in the role of shared ideas as an ideational structure 
constraining and shaping behaviour.“29 Three elements are constitutive to 
constructivist thinking: all actors in the international system have a shared 
understanding for certain ideas and norms that shapes and guides their conduct as a 
kind of ideational structure that is the driving motive behind the system, as opposed 
to neorealist thought, where this incentive is delivered by material structure. 
This ideational structure constructs the identities and interests of the actors in it; the 
actors are being socialized through the process of interaction. Interests and identities 
aren’t constant, but rather subject to change due to the ideational structures radiating 
to them and influencing them in their goals and the definition of their own roles in the 
international arena.  
Ideational structures and actors have a mutually influencial relationship: the same 
way the structure influences the actors, the actors reproduce and alter the structure 
that only exists because of the actors in the first place. Dysfunctional arrangements 
can thus be changed in order to prevent the reproduction of conflicts resulting from it. 
Reality as such is always constructed, historically and socially, and thus almost 
random. It constitutes a product of human construction, and as such, it can be 
changed by the practice of new social processes. This process is very unlikely to 
happen in a short period of time, but the basic possibility of its happening is what 
constructivist thought is all about.30 Wendt points out that „the high death rate of the 
Hobbesian culture creates incentives to create a Lockean culture, and the continuing 
violence of the latter, particularly as the forces of destruction improve in response to 
its competitive logic, creates incentives in turn to move to a Kantian culture.“31 There 
is nowhere near enough to a guarantee that this will happen, but it is safe to assume 
that international relations will at least not develop backwards. History teaches that 
                                            
27 Copeland, "The Constructivist Challenge to Structural Realism: A Review Essay," Constructivism 
and International Relations: Alexander Wendt and His Critics, eds. Stefano Guzzini and Anna Leander 
(Routledge Chapman & Hall, 2006). p. 3-4. 
28 Czempiel, Kluge Macht - Außenpolitik Für Das 21. Jahrhundert. p. 122. 
29 Copeland, "The Constructivist Challenge to Structural Realism: A Review Essay." p. 3. 
30 Ibid. p. 3-4. 
31 Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics. p. 311. 
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once certain rights are acquired, they are only very reluctantly given up again. This is 
true for states as well as individuals.32 
The different views on the world are necessary to understand the diverse 
assumptions about the desirability and standing of international criminal jurisdiction. 
The limits are dim and therefore hard to set; and more and more the different 
theories are branching out into more specific ones.33  
1.2 The Ambiguous Concept of Peace  
1.2.1 The History of Ideas on Peace 
The strive for peace in the international relations is a phenomena that can be traced 
back throughout thousands of years. Preventing wars through the establishment of 
legal orders has been on the agenda of humankind since its origins. The failures 
witnessed throughout all times is obvious through the history of wars. Nevertheless, 
there has been progress in the idea of peaceful conflict-resolution.34  
The pair of opposites of war and peace has been dominating the political life of the 
past century. In the history of ideas of the modern era, the positions on these 
antonyms can be broken down into two main counter antitheses: One defines peace 
as an expression of human will, rationally justified as a political product that requires 
to be the result of agreement through treaties. Its maintenance has to be 
safeguarded through the public order. War is thus the consequence of human 
wrongdoing and as such consitutes normality in intra- and interstate relations.35 
In the other concept, peace is conceived as a cosmic principle of arrangement that 
consitutes a world order that founded its legitimacy in god. After the secularization 
process reason took the place as imperative and legitimator common to all people.36 
This position was taken by Kant. He defined peace as a value constituted by reason 
                                            
32 In order to back up this assertion, Wendt names the example of voting rights: Once granted, there is 
nearly no case in which they were gradually taken away again. Ibid. p. 312. 
33 Schneider, Internationale Gerichtsbarkeit Als Instrument Friedlicher Streitbeilegung. Von Einer 
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which conducts action on the state level as well as the behaviour of the individual. 
The strive for peace is the topic underlying Kant’s entire thinking37 as it constitutes an 
imperative that is categorically imposed on humankind. 38 
The imperative for peace is thus a priori: Reason as the highest morally legislative 
force demands for a state of peace. This in turn calls for the safeguarding of peace 
through law. Peace and law enter into a relationship in which peace is defined 
through law. As such, the definition of peace delivered by Kant is clearly 
distinguishable from older definitions by Augustin, Erasmus, and Pufendorf, who 
defined it through its content.39 
Kant took the thought even further: for a rupture of peace, he demanded retaliation, 
for he thought that by ignoring the crime, the spectator becomes a perpetrator. 
Similar reasoning is also found at Hegel, who felt that by neutralizing the crime it will 
be prevented from attaining validity.40 
Kants ‚Perpetual Peace’ has given impulses to the international peace-discourse that 
havent ceased to influence yet. His call for an international law principled  by reason 
as well as his demand for a universal peace order founded to bind inter-state 
relations and bann military force once and for all can still be heard in scientific 
discussion over peace issues.41 This idea of a law of peace among the nations can 
be seen as the first of its kind and brings in its wake the founding of the United 
Nations that should be established 150 years after the publishing of Kants ‚Perpetual 
Peace.’42 This kind of international peace law, as proposed by Kant, would require a 
system of jurisdictional control in order to function as a global safeguard.43 The 
development of the 20th century as one of growing institutionalization such as 
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through the United Nations and the European Union proves Kant right to a certain 
extent. 
The Kantian concept suggests the rule of law, which, although lacking centralized 
enforcement mechanisms, at least criminalizes certain behaviour, provided that the 
states have internalized these limits that are to be observed. Thus, through this 
internalization, a decentralized authority is created. It doesn’t result in anarchy, 
because anarchy requires the condition of lacking rules, which is not the case. It is 
also not a state or a state-similar entity, such as the EU. Wendt, the creator of this 
concept, argues that the idea of centralized power is so predominant in thinking 
about authority, that this idea of a decentralized authority is only slowly starting to 
grasp attention.44  
Waltz treates the international system as one of anarchy due to the lack of hierarchy 
that within states is sustained through the control of power in the form of government. 
International hierarchy could thus take the shape of a world government. The idea 
‚governance without government’, developed by Helen Miller, suggests the 
governance through international institutions.45 In general, the Lockean view of the 
Westphalian state system has steadily kept dominating the past three centuries. 
Streaks of Hobbesianism have never managed to successsfully spread a ‚kill or be 
killed climate’ and rule out the ‚live and let live system.’46 
1.2.2 The History of Ideas on Warfare 
„When talking about peace, don’t remain silent on war.“47 For a more thorough 
perspective on peace, the concept of war cannot be left untouched. How to regulate 
violence has been one of the most profound questions related to establishing order 
that consequently affects all areas of life.48 
Two questions have shaped the history of ideas on warfare: the embodiment of the 
ius ad bellum, the right to warfare, and the ius in bello, regulating the permissible 
behaviour in war. The dual structure is virtually consequential: The foundation of 
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states in the modern era limited the right to warfare to the sovereign only, thus the 
limitation of the law in warfare needed to be bodied out.49  
In the years from 1648 to 1945 inter-state wars dominated the international relations  
and coined its structure. Attempts to regulate warfare were made during this era by 
regularizing the legality of starting a war (iusta causa belli) as well as controlling 
warfare as such by standardizing what is allowed during warfare (ius in bello). The 
emergence of law to regularize interstate conflicts took place around the beginning of 
the nineteenth century: this international humanitarian law – to use the modern term - 
regulates the conditions under which war is warrantable. It can be described as the 
attempt to regulate the irregular.50 Aiming at damage-containment in the context of a 
war situation, international humanitarian law is led by the belief that certain behaviour 
that is not tolerated in peaceful times is standard procedure in war situations. 
Nevertheless, the range of tolerance is also not unlimited during times of war, 
concentrating especially on the protection of certain people and objects. The 
humanization of war roots in the enlightened states of the 18th and 19th century, 
specifically in the ideas of Henri Dunant. The Swiss philantrope developed a set of 
measurements to improve the situation of the wounded and ill which formed the basis 
of the foundation for national committees of the Red Cross. It was later modified and 
expanded to cover also the wounded and shipwrecked resulting from maritime 
warfare.51 Although it had been agreed upon, no enforcement mechanisms were ever 
arranged in order to control the abidance of these provisions.52 In general, since the 
establishment of the prohibition of the use of force, this has been severely abridged. 
Further, the alteration of war threatens to render international humanitarian law 
obsolete.53 
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1.2.3 Peace and Justice 
If international justice is what is strived for by the ICC, it is essential to clarify the 
meaning of it. Is the idea of bringing justice an illusion of the political sciences?54 The 
belief that prosecution of crimes leads to deterrence and justice and, in the long run, 
to peace, is the leitmotiv preceding the establishment of the Court. Clearly, to define 
justice in the legal tradition misses out on the moral dimension. To avoid that, justice 
has to be more than the compliance of existing laws.55  
If assumed that justice is not an international category but a national one, a clash of 
views between different states with different cultures will inevitably occur when justice 
is pursued in a crime scenario involving more than one culture. Czempiel concludes 
from this that in an international system, peace cannot be an achievement of justice, 
because justice is followed by war. So justice and peace stand in a contradictory 
relation towards each other. Both require the existence of the other in order to 
subsist. If justice is left aside in order to guarantee an unjust peace, violence persists. 
On the other hand, if justice is considered, violence will still persists due to the 
subjectivity of justice. The only possibility to rule out the dilemma is to state that 
peace must imply the renounciation of violence while pursuing justice.56 
Peace created in a legal form and the existence of justice are mutually dependant. 
Also, they create and carry one another into effect. This moots the question as to 
how the relation between peace and justice can be seen. If justice is placed over 
peace, that would make the latter its natural product. In this context, war constitutes a 
recess: bellum ruptura pacis. Peace is thus not-war: pax absentia belli. If peace has 
to be established through the public order, justice is the legitimating force behind it 
and thus subordinate to peace. Naturally, without peace justice can’t be carried into 
effect.57 
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Adapting the hypothesis laid out by Meyers, the present antinomy can be traced back 
in the history of ideas. Peace as a condition endowed by agreement versus natural 
peace as an expression of justice, underlying the notion of reason. In the era of 
absolutism the construction of the Anstaltsstaat (institutional state) received the 
standing of a union for peace.58 The national state is the temporary culmination of the 
intent to maintain intrastate peace. Within this, the notions of peace are transferred 
from the inner-state level to the international level. The constitution of states as 
unions for peace on the inside allows for inter-state relations to come into existence. 
Suddenly, the superior leviathan exists no more, the states find themselves in an 
anarchic system that doesn’t guarantee peace. The realist strive for power over 
ressources and territory as well as economic superiority demands for peace to be 
brought about by a contract. The terms peace and peace treaty thus become 
identical. Meyers describes this as the emergence of a formal peace notion, that was 
followed by the latter notion of peace in substantive law as a reaction to a definition 
of peace that was solely defined through the absence of war.59  
The imperative to justice is universal. So are various kinds of crimes, such as 
narcotrafficking or human trafficking. Crimes against humanity lead to a collective 
and global sense of responsibility. The strive for justice that legitimizes the national 
state thus are the same suggesting the foundation of a world republic.60 Wendt 
names the example of Americans typically identifying with the US, but also Canada 
and the West and essentially, especially in certain issues that include large crime 
scenarios, with the entire humankind. Based on this reasoning, the same can be true 
of states: different issues will be met with different degrees of willingness to engage 
in sharing. However, when sovereignty is involved, its safe to presume that the 
disposition to cooperation is hard to attain.61  
Another view is that of doubt regarding the deterring effect of punishment and the 
proposition of trading peace for justice in order to end a conflict.62 However, justice 
cannot be entirely ruled out in the process. It might not necessarily be achieveable in 
each and every case through international criminal law, but it still has to be strived for 
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in order to establish peace. If not by retrospectively bringing justice to the victims, 
‚preventive social justice’ can be established. It is the lack of this kind of justice that 
enables the mobilization of the masses necessary in order to commit large-scale 
crimes.63 On the other hand, „someone facing prosecution before an international 
Court may perhaps hold the opinion that he has not much to lose, but may gain a lot, 
perhaps, even avoiding criminal responsibility, when continuing a programme of 
ethnical cleansing.“64 And further, „must it be taken for granted, that persons in 
charge of such power will not put their foot down to stop atrocities, if they are sure 
that they have to face prosecution and trial immediately after their opponents or the 
international community gets hold of them?“65 
1.2.4 Peace through Enforcement of International Criminal Law 
The theoretical framework guiding the establishment of the International Criminal 
Court suggests the promotion of peace through law. Quite frankly, by transforming 
the national democratic model of law and order onto the international level. Dispeace 
or lack of peace is often brought about by insecurity. The predictability of behaviour 
of the other facilitates the relinquishment of violence to protect the self. Making 
international relations more predictable is one of the core functions of international 
law. By creating the general framework for the abandonment of violence such as 
regulations as for the whereabouts of dispute resolution and crisis management, this 
can be achieved.66 Peace as such is the motive and ultimate goal of the legal 
system, regardless of whether the actual term peace is employed.  
Czempiel defines peace as a political and economic process, that promotes the 
maintenance of the existence of the individual by reducing violent settlement of 
disputes, and guarantees a continuous unfolding of their existence by securing the 
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increase of equal opportunities.67 The judiciary’s main purpose is to indistinctively 
enforce the rights of people.68 
Johan Galtung defines harmony as a state absent of direct and structural violence. 
The concept of peace outlined by him suggests the existence of negative and 
positive peace. Negative peace defines itself through the absence of substantial 
violence, positive peace includes also the absence of structural violence.69 Peace is 
thus more than a state absent of war.70 Thus, positive peace and injustice cannot 
exist at the same time.71 
How will international criminal law contribute to the establishment of peace? Penal 
law is as such orientated towards the past as it penalizes crimes that have happened 
in the past. By resolving the issue, peace in the future is hoped for. Hence, penal law 
can only create negative peace by itself. Positive peace will follow after the 
establishment of a blueprint for lasting peace, a task mainly in the hands of politics.72 
In order to achieve this, the existence of mutual benefit is irreplaceable. Treaties and 
conventions constitute attempts to build harmony on normative, renumerative and 
punitive power. Unequal treaties will freeze hierarchies in the way they are and thus 
constitute structural violence. An example for such a non peace-building treaty is the 
Treaty of Versailles.73 
The international community thus requires a set of mutually binding normative 
expectations. Galtung differentiates between dissociative and associative peace 
systems, the latter being based on cooperation on a social basis and spatially 
through communication. A dissociative model would suffice for negative peace at 
most. In the associative state system, treaties, conventions, and organizations are 
woven in that serve as repositories for normative regulations that all parties stick to 
and in turn expect to be abided by others. 74 
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1.2.5 Cultural Relativism vs. Universal Applicability 
International Criminal Law asserts the claim to global significance. Thus it is 
necessary to ascertain the rightfulness of this claim. If its emergence is dependant on 
cultural values, can we nevertheless assume its international all-embracing validity?75 
Considering the aspirations of international criminal law to claim universal validity and 
significance, to affirm that there are cultural differences prevailing in principle would 
reduce these ambitions to absurdity.76 World War II at the latest generated a global 
awareness for grave breaches of human rights. The degree of this awareness, 
however, differs among the peoples of the world.77 Similarly, the perception of justice 
is created through consens within a particular culture.78 Yet the establishment of 
world courts suggest that certain dictums enjoy universal validity – that is to say – 
that independent off ethnic, religious or geographical factors, there is agreement on a 
number of issues, generally involving the biggest committable atrocities.79 Schneider 
calls the strive for peace a value linking the peoples.80  
As seen in the recent debate on the charges pressed against the Sudanese 
president Omar Hassan-al-Bashir, Arab leaders united in defending al-Bashir against 
what they call ‚Western colonial arrogance’. The Court’s actions, they argue, are 
designed based on the Western perception of the Arab countries as weak. By 
pressing forward with an arrest warrant, the Court is interfering with the sovereignty 
of Sudan, who didn’t sign or ratify the Statute of Rome and is thus not a states-party 
to the Court. This reproach of the ICC operating in violation of the third-party-principle 
will be discussed further in Chapter 4.2.1. Another argument held against the 
rightfulness of al-Bashirs indictment blames the ICC to act based on Western double-
standards. While accusing al-Bashir, no criticism has been proclaimed towards 
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Israel’s offensive in Gaza and Lebanon. Further, they demanded criminal prosecution 
of the US war in Iraq.81 
The deep disagreement between the Arab League and the actions taken by the 
Court is clearly visible. However, the criticism is not directed towards the content of 
the charges. It is safe to assume that the large-scale atrocities committed in Sudan 
are not viewed as such by the West only. As clearly pointed out, Israels actions in 
Gaza are clearly considered war crimes by the Arab League. Hence, we can assume 
that there is agreement over these atrocious acts constituting crimes. The indictment 
of al-Bashir is perceived as injust, but reasoning is based on interference in internal 
affairs of Sudan and an allegedly biased view of the atrocities committed there, and 
not on a general dissent over the fact that human rights are being violated. 
1.2.5.1 Western Imperialism? 
The ICC was founded through a multinational treaty between a number of states 
without narrowing the definition of state down to a common denominator. This leads 
to an essential queston: Do all states share combining values such as governance or 
democracy? Quite frankly, the states-parties to this treaty differ greatly in terms of 
their internal constitutions. 
The dominance of the state as the only legitimate holder of power, a prerequisite in 
order to be able to implement binding decisions, varies to great extents in many 
developing countries.82 Consequently the next step required by international criminal 
jurisdiction – the crucial relinquishment of sovereignty – depends on this sovereignty 
to exist in the first place. The model pursued thus essentially skips a mandatory 
stage of development, if the western democratic model of statehood is what 
international criminal law is based on.  
On a theoretical basis, the definition of statehood necessary in order to be able to 
comply with the ICC’s requirements can be broken down to an effective authority of 
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the state in order to be able to seize and search and perform arrests, and a juridical 
arm that needs to be, not necessary fully, but basically functioning. The fact that the 
treaty exercises binding force on the population further requires an effective authority 
of the state in order to legitimately sign it as their representative. However, a 
functioning democracy is not anywhere near a prerequisite. But from a functional 
point of view, considering that the ICC is an institution that relies to a great deal on its 
member-states for execution of its decisions, it is only to be expected how certain 
states will assert their authority on their national territory. 
Nevertheless, the question of cultural imperialism touches on one of the core issues 
in international institutions and moreover in international criminal tribunals: Are the 
methods of conflict solving thereby aspired globally applicable? Is international 
criminal law enforceable in states where national power is not enforceable? And 
further, is the ICC emblematically an embodiment exporting democracy? 
A thorough discussion of this issue would not only go beyond the scope of this thesis, 
but will inevitably require time for the institution to be confronted with these 
scenarios.  It can still be ascertained that a clear dichotomy exists in the 
considerations concerning the ICC’s features: the institution aspires moral strength 
and therefore doesn’t exclude anyone who will be willing to cooperate. The practical 
weakness that results from and grows proportionally to this moral strength is 
problematic, but essentially it is this moral strength that the court strives for that 
enables rejecting the accusation of western imperialism. The possibility of abuse of 
the ICC through western imperialist nations, however, is not out of the question, as 
will be laid out in chapter 4. Through international criminal law a medium of norms is 
created that can be legitimately enforced, even or especially in the case of an inner-
state collapse. The question as to whether international criminal law can be enforced 
when the national state is powerless can be affirmed: Where the  hands of the 
international community were legally tied before, a loophole has been formed to act 
on legitimate legal ground. 
Since the Court intervenes in the most serious violations of human rights around the 
globe, the reproach of exporting democracy might seem valid at first. However, as a 
juridical institution dedicated to justice after grave breaches, the Court by definition 
acts in retrospect. As such, it clears up past offenses without conducting future 
scenarios. The ICC engages in the penal prosecution of criminals as an outsider. The 
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establishment of democratic institutions constitutes a possible consequence to the 
ICC’s interference, but is not in the hands of the Court. The Court steps in as a 
defender of human rights where the national state fails to do so. Hence, the labeling 
of its endeavours as exports of democracy sustain to the extent that by applying the 
rule of law, an attribute of a constitutional state is being imposed on a semi-universal 
level. A normative guidance as to in which direction less developed countries should 
aim their progress is given through international justice. 
1.2.5.2 Neopatrimonialism 
The theories that have been applied in Chapter 2.1. represent the biggest theories of 
international relations. Since a failure of these can be detected especially in the 
context of explaining developing countries, it deems necessary to address this 
problem. Due to the distinct forms in which development has taken place in different 
areas of the world, inevitably a number of distinct models of states exist. On many, 
the concept of statehood has rather been imposed than developed by itself and 
subsequently malfunctioned. Neopatrimonialist states are not failed states, because 
this would require that they have been states that subsequently failed. The status of 
statehood has, however, never been accomplished. ‚Spheres of limited statehood’ 
are attributed as particularly jeopardized in erupting into violent war: of the 200 wars 
waged since 1945, 90 per cent occured in transforming or developing countries (as of 
2008).83 
Neopatrimonialism merges traditional and modern elements and constitutes a period 
of transition. Wimmer focuses on countries south of the Sahara, which is precisely 
where the four conflicts the ICC is currently administering are located. 
Neopatrimonialism is indicated through personal rule, clientelistic politics and 
endemic corruption. A neopatrimonialistic regime, or rather, a neopatrimonialistic 
system, can be defined as one that is prevented from developing towards modern 
statehood through blockades that are mostly produced by the system itself. 
According to Wimmer, one of the indicators of a neopatrimonial system is the 
strikingly low level of institutionalization of law, a fact that is yet aggravated by the 
structures of its political system which stands contrary to development of certainty of 
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law.84 „The perverseness of state power from a guarantor of law and order to an 
entity threatening the integrity of people has its roots in this and became the rule 
rather than the exception in sub-saharan Africa.“85 This is a problem for the 
acknowledgement of the legitimacy a tool such as the ICC requires to enjoy among 
the affected people. The association with western ideas of governance could tip the 
scale in both ways for the ICC: it could be perceived by the population as a white 
knight strong enough and able to interfere with national state malfunctions, or it could 
be equated with other forms of not self-chosen power imposed on them and yet 
worse, even by a foreign power. 
1.3 Peace as a Normative Objective in the United Nations 
The establishment of peace defined the utter objective of the League of Nations. The 
UN took over that same objective of the League of Nations and ranks peace within its 
top priorities,86 if not its single and only reason for existence. „The United Nations 
was created primarily ‚to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war’.“87 In 
terms of regularization of the international sphere the foundation of the United 
Nations constitutes a step ahead away from the state of nature between states.88 
Highlighting the need „to practice tolerance and live together in peace with one 
another as good neighbours, and to unite our strength to maintain international peace 
and security“ the UN’s charter „affirms  faith in fundamental human rights, in the 
dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of 
nations large and small.“89 Through ongoing communication through an international 
institution, wars that aim at the abolition of the other’s existence are reduced in 
likeliness. The ‚absoluteness of war’ is no longer given. Rather, through the existence 
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of the UN and the membership in it, the necessity of cooperation and communication 
is acknowledged.90 
The use of violence is ranked as the ultimate device for peacekeeping. A more 
profound emphasis on peaceful and therefore violence-free methods of 
peacekeeping emerged during the times of the Cold War. This resulted out of the 
dilemma of not being capable to make decisions that would have required military 
force. With the end of that blockade, the relevance of peacekeeping by using military 
force grew along with the (re-)obtained competence of decision-making in the 
Security Council.91 The restraint of intervention and the use of force that builds one of 
the core principles and purposes of the UN aims at a centralization of the power to 
exert violence and promotes the perception of peace as the ultimate goal in 
international relations. The concept of the ‚responsibility to protect’ has engaged the 
UN in a debate on the necessity to intervene in cases of state failure in enacting 
good governance.92 The grey area between illegitimate interference and the 
imperative to assist another country’s population is becoming smaller and clearer. 
Along with the upsurge of the human rights movement, this has lead to a challenge of 
the notion of ‚sovereignty at all costs.’  
Punishment was replaced by the establishment of peace as the foremost output of 
criminal prosecution in the course of the 20th century. Before that, it was left 
unnoticed or even considered unsolicited and counterproductive as a means to 
promote peace: Especially after World War I the apprehension that the process of 
coming to terms with the past would produce more hatred was very common.93 The 
Resolution that established the ICTY, itself the first modern-day tribunal, lists the 
belief that this tribunal „would contribute to the restoration and maintenance of 
peace.“94 Above all through the anticipated effect of deterrence a promotion of peace 
was envisaged.95 Nitsche refers to this process as ‚a refinement of the instruments of 
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international politics’.96 This was additionally intensified through the gradual 
strengthening of the UN’s primary juridical tool, the ICJ, and in further consequence 
the establishment of the ICC. 
2 International Criminal Law 
2.1 International Criminal Law – An Introduction 
While jurisprudence invokes the issue of peace and will refer to it in order to justify 
decisions and legislation, it mostly avoids to go into depth on the notion of peace. 
Political science anon evades the legal sphere. The grey area between the two 
disciplines is where definitions of obligations, rights, and hierarchy become very 
vague. 
Criminal law is considered necessary for a peaceful nation. Thus, criminal provisions 
in international law cannot be out of place when pursuing peace in the international 
relations.97 Two aspects, international peace and security and the collective 
conscience of humankind form the principal arguments for the introduction of 
international criminal law into the highly valuable sphere of criminal right.98 The 
necessity to equally protect human rights in order to claim their universal validity is 
reflected in the development of international jurisdiction.99 It reflects the view of 
crimes against humanity and genocide being crimes that the entire international 
community is victimized by.100 The most symbolic event constituted the trials in 
Jerusalem against Adolf Eichmann, where Israel pressed charges for committing 
crimes against the Jewish people before a Court that had not even existed yet at the 
time when these crimes had been committed. In short, the Eichmann trials lacked 
each of the components that are usually imperative in order to rightfully claim 
jurisdiction over a criminal case. They were based on the idea, that „certain crimes 
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are so universally agreed to be heinous, so potentially disruptive of international 
peace, and so difficult for any one state to adequately prosecute, that all states have 
the right to try anyone accused of them.“101 
International criminal law combines the spheres of traditional penal law and 
international law in a conflictive manner. Penal Law is as such nation-based and 
implies the sovereignty of the state like any other branch of law. International Law is 
a young and less developed field102, characterized by the classic aspect that 
combines international activity in unison: it lacks absolute and destinctive 
enforcement. International criminal law takes from both these branches of law to form 
a distinctive third one: It demands sovereignty to pune, therefore requires for the 
national state to give up on punitive sovereignty – an aspect making filing for the 
court a long and complicated endeavour. 
While international law binds only the states as the contracting parties, in 
international criminal law citizens of the contractual partners become liable for 
breaches of international law. This recognition of individual criminal responsibility 
directly under international law is the greatest achievement of international criminal 
law and as such the element designed to bring about the biggest changes.103 
Triffterer points out that this is especially significant in order „to protect in a subsidiary 
way legal values which primarily and originally belong to the national legal order in 
situations in which State organs or Government officials commit or participate at least 
tacitly in the commission of the crime and the relevant national judicial systems, 
therefore, may not be willing or in the position to properly prosecute such 
behaviour.“104 The intention is to put an end to impunity, which describes the lack of 
imposing  criminal sanctions against breaches of human rights,105 especially against 
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the masterplanning minds behind macro-crimes. The irrelevance of official capacity 
of the indicted is clearly mentioned in the Statute of the ICC.106 
The term international criminal law covers a broad range of provisions and is 
constantly growing as the amount of international rules accounting for crimes under 
international law is rising. ICL is derived from international law, national criminal law, 
comparative criminal law and procedures as well as international and regional human 
rights law. Its penal aspects are deduced from conventions, customs and general 
principles of law.107  Article 38 of the Statute of the ICJ sets out that international 
criminal law can inherently be created by all sources of the law of nations. This is 
deduced from the concept that legal systems develop their own norms and 
standards. The law of nations thus does the same and independently creates its own 
norms.108  To acommodate these different branches and areas isn’t easy; the result 
is a very heterogenous conglomerate.109 Basically, this set of laws is applied by 
international courts as well as national courts and internationalized courts.110 
International law can be conceived as a conglomerate of processes of conflict 
resolution in the international community. As such, it has to serve as a basis for 
international criminal proceedings, as it did in the case of the ICTY and the ICTR.111  
The codification of human rights in international law is mostly an achievement of the 
UN.112 The overall most important stations ICL has passed were the GC, the 
Genocide Convention and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.113 „Every 
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custom has its origin in a single act“114 – this is believed to be the Nuremberg trials 
for International Criminal Jurisdiction.115 The main functions of International Criminal 
Law are to prevent and suppress international criminality, enhance accountability, 
reduce impunity and establish international criminal justice.116  
The set of rules and regulations is essentially complete. Solving conflicts by brutally 
repressing has become illegal.117 The bigger problem the international community is 
facing now is the problem of effective enforcement and the challenge of „narrow(ing) 
the gap between norms and behavior.“118 
2.2 Evolution of International Criminal Law 
The development of international criminal law has not occured in a linear manner. 
The reason for its partly fallow, partly overturning evolution can be explained by the 
fact that progression of international criminal law has always ensued after grave 
historical crimes, and only then.119 The first proposal to a universal court was made 
as early as 1870/71: the impressions of the Prussian-French War prompted the 
Swiss Gustave Moynier to press ahead with this proposition. Too early in a period of 
time, where the thought of one sovereign imposing jurisdictional control upon another 
sovereign was unbearable.120  
The following outline of the Court’s evolution will be subdivided into five different 
stages throughout the twentieth century. The goal is to depict the gradual 
development of the idea of international criminal justice that led to the ICC as its 
transitory terminal station. A concept from Sadat shall be adopted for this thesis, 
beginning with the two Conferences of the Hague and the First World War, the 
tribunals of Nuremberg and Tokyo, the post-war and Cold War period, the foundation 
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of the two ad hoc tribunals, and ultimately the ICC.121 The ICTY and the ICTR can be 
considered as direct predecessors of the ICC, which where anon preceeded by the 
IMT and the IMTFE. The establishment of the ICC is even seen as the natural 
consequence of the foundation of the UN and the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights by some.122 The attempts before the ad hoc tribunals cannot be put in a direct 
linear conjunction with them, given that they were based on entirely different 
premises, but rather as the seeds of the general idea.123 In conclusion, the 
establishment of the ICC represents a logical culmination of a development that 
spans over the past fifty or even hundred years in an attempt to enforce at least 
partly-universal justice.124 
2.2.1 The Conferences of The Hague and World War I 
‚The First International Peace Conference’ was held in 1899 in The Hague, though 
the term used to describe it is deceiving. The reason for the call-up was an arms race 
that the Tsar of Russia could no longer afford and therefore wished to end by 
inducing a disarmament process. Declarations and Conventions were set up, spiked 
with numerous clauses regulating exceptions.125 „Signatories agreed to ‚use their 
best efforts (...) as far as possible’ and to disregard the rules if national honor or 
‚essential interests’ might be endangered“, making it „more a wishlist than a binding 
accord.“126 
In 1907 a second conference was held in The Hague and accomplished 
approximately the same results as the first. The conferences of the Hague are 
characterized by the standards of a Hobbesian order of states-politics, above all by 
the tenet that states are only subject to their own law, unless they consent to law 
legislated by a different origin. Time wasn’t ready for the major changes that a turn in 
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the view towards the notion of statehood would have brought along.127 It wasnt until 
the atrocities committed during World War I, that the thought of prosecution of war 
crimes was seriously considered and proposed from all over.128 Triffterer names the 
Balkan wars in 1912-1913 as the trigger for serious reflections on a permanent 
international criminal court.129 Essentially the League of Nations commenced the 
attempt to erect a permanent court and was followed in this endeavour by the UN.130 
Accountability was first introduced into a field hitherto untouched by it, including that 
of state officials reputedly liable for international crimes. Indeed, the close-minded, 
hobbesian view of the state-of-the-art nation was challenged: the foundation of the 
International Labour Organization to protect the interests of workers, a range of 
treaties on minorities to protect their status and the attempt to regulate warfare with 
regard to restricting its methods were heralding the fact that state-sovereignty could 
be altered.131 
Following World War One, the Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of 
the War and on the Enforcement of Penalties that had been founded at the 
Preliminary Peace Conference in 1919, suggested the establishment of an 
international high tribunal to prosecute those accused of crimes against humanity 
and violation of the laws of war. The target was former German Emperor William II; 
the trial, however, was never realized.132 Nevertheless, the seed was planted. The 
Advisory Committee of Jurists of the League of Nations advanced a Resolution to 
establish a High Court of International Justice, the ILA suggested the formation of an 
international court in 1926 followed by the AIDP in 1928. Both of these proposals 
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included the suggestion to try both states and individuals, but upon neither was 
bestowed consideration.133 As pointed out by Cassese, „ (...) these initiatives could 
not bear fruit in a period which placed an exceptionally high premium upon 
considerations of national sovereignty.“134 The debate entered into a crunch mode at 
this point, marking the fact that discussion had entered into the critical phase where 
certain long-established notions of the state, its rights and obligations, were 
challenged. Essentially, World  War I shows how far states will go jeopardizing 
international justice for political purposes.135 Furthermore, the absence of  an 
international souvereign power disturbed the vision of positive international law. In 
addition to that, no consensus could be found on whether such a court would even 
be helpful in the mission to help prevent war. Rather it was feared that the threat of 
prosecution after a long and painful war would mean the killing stroke for any 
attempts to establish peace.136 
2.2.2 The Nuremberg and Tokyo Trials 
Efforts to create an International Criminal Court were taken up again after the 
atrocities of World War II. The US proved to be the biggest advocate of a trial rather 
than an execution of the Nazi leaders.137 In the aftermath of the Second World War, 
the International Commission for Penal Reconstruction and Development and the 
United Nations War Crimes Commission drafted suggestions and proposals 
concerning the establishment of a court to try war criminals. The proposition most 
alike to today’s court was that of the London International Assembly from the year 
1941, made under the guardianship of the League of Nations. It proposed the 
prosecution of cases that would fail to belong in the jurisdiction of any state; the 
cases being reduced to a small and mostly undefined range of war crimes. It even 
proposed to install an international police force responsible for executing the orders 
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of the Court.138 What followed were the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals, both wielded 
as the poorest examples of international criminal jurisdiciton in the scientific literature 
on the topic. With the Nuremberg trials receiving much more attention for the sake of 
the bad aftertaste the Tokyo Trials left, both lacked credibility. The agreement, 
commonly known as the London Accord, summarized in thirty articles the procedural 
conditions and the range of its jurisdiction. The crimes charged are the same as 
those of the comtemporary ICC: Crimes against peace, war crimes, and crimes 
against humanity, lacking the controversial crime of aggression. The objection of the 
accused Germans concerning state sovereignty were rejected by the tribunal139, thus 
the concept of crimes being under international criminal law was manifested.140 This 
aspect bears the criticism of impinging on the nullum crimen sine proevia lege 
principle, however, it marked the beginning of the process in the course of which 
these offenses were subjected to international customary law. The Nuremberg Trials 
adopted the thought, that since murder and other serious offenses were considered 
delinquencies in every constitutional legal order, it could be argued that they 
constitute a kind of universal jurisdiction.141 The Charter held the defendants 
accountable regardless of their position and standing within the state, as well as 
disallowing them to plead pursuance of their vocation.142 The tribunal sought to justify 
the controversial jurisdiction by coining the phrase: „Crimes against international law 
are committed by men, not by abstract entities, and only by punishing individuals who 
commit such crimes can the provisions of international law be enforced.“143  
The accusation of the Nuremberg trials to be the tribunal of the victors are not, 
however, without cause. The political and psychological aftermath of the war was 
undoubtedly crucial for the outcome of the process, prohibiting a fair and just trial.144 
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The fact that the victors of the war executed the post-war justice makes it impossible 
to speak of a court that meets constitutional standards.145  
While the supremacy of international law over national law was stressed and the 
objection concerning the relinquishing of sovereignty of the states was overcome, all 
of this was only accomplished due to the uneven balance between the allies and 
Germany. Still, by cherishing the idea of individual accountability of war crimes, be it 
to initiate it or for the means of how it was carried out, the International Military 
Tribunal „established the wrongfulness of aggression.“146 Thus, it criminalized the ius 
in bello as well as the ius ad bellum. The reproach of applying law that wasn’t 
positive and had never been applied before turns out to be the most interesting, 
considering how true this is. However, through the creation of a legal precedent, as 
occured, the positive law had been produced as well. Considering especially that the 
sentence of the IMT is technically not legally binding, the moral signal it emits carries 
significantly more weight.147 The tribunals greatest achievement remains that of 
signalizing the moral and political as well as ethical and legal wrongfulness of war as 
a means of solving conflict between states. Concerning international justice, the post-
World War II scenario showed how potent the concept can be provided there is the 
political will backing it up.148  
2.2.3 The Post-War & Cold-War Period 
The idea of an international criminal court was pursued both on the scientific and the 
political level after the Nuremberg and Tokyo Trials.149 In 1944, Kelsen wrote that 
„consequently, the next step on which our efforts must be concentrated is to bring 
about an international treaty concluded by as many states as possible, victors as well 
as vanquished, establishing an international criminal court endowed with compulsory 
jurisdiction.“150 The UN commissioned committees to reach the codification of the 
                                            
145 Fairness and justice would have required the criminal investigation of the atomic bombs dropped 
on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. 
146 Sadat, The International Criminal Court and the Transformation of International Law: Justice for the 
New Millenium.p. 30. See also: Sadat, "The Evolution of the Icc: From the Hague to Rome and Back 
Again." p. 35.  
147 Sadat, The International Criminal Court and the Transformation of International Law: Justice for the 
New Millenium.p. 30. 
148 Cassese, "From Nuremberg to Rome: International Military Tribunals to the International Criminal 
Court." p. 8.  
149 Blanke, "Der Internationale Strafgerichtshof." p. 143. 
150 Kelsen, Peace through Law (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1944). p. 14. 
 34 
Nuremberg principles151 and pooled its efforts for the same goal as had the League 
of Nations: an international criminal jurisdiction for such crimes,152 The only 
difference being that the League had aspired a court that worked on the grounds of 
the 1937 Terrorism Convention. The goal of the United Nations is traceable based on 
the codification of international crimes and the elaboration of a draft statute for a 
court.153 At the same time, the Genocide Convention was developed and adopted, 
which also pondered the establishment of an international criminal court.154 
In 1948 the United Nations raised the question of an international criminal court 
installed on a permanent basis. The reference to this court made in article VI of the 
Genocide Convention had been removed for the time of substantial objection to such 
a court and put back into place later.155 The manufacturing of a draft statute for a 
permanent court and the codification process of crimes under international law were 
ineptly two seperate processes. This too is explicable with the missing political will to 
make the project determined and focused on its realistic completion.156 The 
International Law Commission, established in 1948, was handed over the task of 
evaluating the possible establishment of an international court and to further discuss 
its desirability.157  It could not be agreed upon whether such a universal court was 
even desirable, given the fact that the major powers would not consent to it: „the 
Soviet Union believed its sovereignty would be affected by the establishment of such 
a tribunal; the United States was not prepared to accept the establishment of such a 
court at the height of the ‚Cold War;’ France expressed support for the establishment 
of a permanent international criminal court, but did not throw its weight to further the 
process; and the UK regarded the idea as politically premature.“158  
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The draft code remained on the agenda of the United Nations even during the Cold 
War but the atmosphere in international relations during this period had completely 
frozen every means of international communication and development.159 Attempting 
to press ahead with an international criminal court was inconceivable at times when 
the idea of military and political decisions being avenged by an international 
institution and its exploitation for political purposes were feared.160 As a direct 
consequence of this the Security Council, unable to find some common ground on 
which to base, stood and watched tremendous breaches of human rights.161 
Bassiouni trenchantly calls the period from 1955-1992 ‚the years of silence’.162 This 
period even more so than others was characterized by an almost infinite amount of 
conflicts that weren’t followed by international criminal prosecution. ‚Justice was the 
Cold Wars casualty.’163 For instance, international criminal prosecution of Apartheid 
was planned, but never realized. In 1979, the ad hoc Committee for South Africa 
enquired for a draft statute for such an institution, but nothing was reached.164 This 
culture is best described as souvereignity at all costs, even that of humaneness.165 
The GA established a Special Committee consisting of representatives from 17 
different states in 1950 to elaborate the drafting of a convention for the erection of a 
permanent court.166 In a new draft, called the Geneva Draft, issued by the committee 
in 1951, the aspect of desirability was left aside to discuss how such a court could 
function. The outcoming proposal included many of the aspects that were later also 
part of the ILC draft statute in 1994 and ultimately of the Rome Statute: the 
recommended erection via multilaterial convention to primarily avoid making the court 
an organ of the UN and having to amend the charta  and secondly circumvent the 
erection via assembly resolution for cause of legal difficulties. It also proposed to 
extend its jurisdiction over natural persons only, as well as solely on the basis of 
conventions or agreements and that again only if the affected state transfers 
authority to the court. Jurisdiction should further have been supject to prior approval 
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by the general assembly. The biggest difference that this proposal of a generally 
weak court comprises compared to the current ICC is that it suggested a semi-
permanent court only. The international response to this proposition made it clear 
that no support, specifically none of the major players, could be expected.167 
The General Assembly further requested a similar committee to manufacture a new 
report that took after its predecessor by and large in 1953. This new draft had been 
produced knowing of how the odds were for obtaining acceptance for such a court: 
The outcome proved to be more realistic, including a significant weakening of the 
courts power.168 The political will to consent was lacking in both cases; neither of the 
two was ever implemented. Furthermore, the UN settled on a definition of agression 
in 1974 which made it clear that it would be the task of the SC to define whether or 
not agression was on hand.169 
2.2.4 The ad hoc Tribunals  
After the loosening of the two blocks of the Cold War, work on the court was taken up 
with a new ray of hope. The disolution of the former predominant policemen-system 
left fragmentation and turmoil in the international system. Uprising of nationalism and 
fundamentalism were the cause of a great number of mostly internal wars.170 The 
great majority of wars that have been fought since 1945 were staged in third-world 
countries, the end of the Cold War changed little about this fact.171 By its end, more 
wars broke out in the least and less developed countries than ever before. Since the 
end of the Second World War, an approximated 170 million people have died in the 
course of over 250 wars and conflicts, a testimony to the necessity of efficient peace-
enforcing measurements.172 Multiethnical states imploded, causing grave breaches 
of human rights. Particularly the former Eastern block burst with national and ethnic 
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conflicts, producing an unimagineable amount of atrocities.173 The war in Former 
Yugoslavia broke out with uncontrollable agression, ethnic as well as religious and 
political war was waged.174 Simultaneously, the Human Rights Movement and the 
pressure on the dignity of man were undergoing an upsurge. The situation was 
similar to the climate after World War II: Fury over such egregious direness was 
immense and incited work on a permanent court at last.175 In addition to that, the vast 
number of wars provoked the political and scientific discourse on the role of 
international institutions in the future prevention and intervention in wars.176 
Both the ICTY as well as the ICTR were produced by a resolution, not by a 
multilateral treaty.177 In 1992, Res. 780 determined a commission of experts to 
evaluate whether the GC or other international humanitarian laws had been violated 
in Former Yugoslavia. This was affirmed, and subsequently the ICTY was 
established.178 This was essentially the first time a tribunal decided over the outcome 
of a conflict that was not erected by the winning party.179 When the war in Rwanda 
broke out in 1994, the unwillingness of the international community to interfere led to 
the death of an estimated half a million Rwandans. Given the fact that the tribunal 
hence erected was the second tribunal in a relatively short time, the political 
persuasion process consumed less time than for the first tribunal.180 The court for 
Rwanda is considered to reflect the endeavour to erect a tribunal outside the west 
and thus prevent the impression of double-standards in the international criminal law. 
Furthermore, the Rwandan Government itself asked for such a court.181 The tribunal 
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was created by Resolution 955 on November 8, 1994, declaring the situation in 
Rwanda a threat to international peace and security.182  
While the ICTY was established while fighting was still going on and with the 
intention to deter future criminal action, the ICTRs foundation followed the war in 
Rwanda. Its aim was to contribute to the peace and reconciliation process.183 While 
the ICTY was likewise set up with the goal to fuel the restoration of peace, 
reconciliation was not explicitly mentioned, but still considered a goal implicit to the 
general purpose of the tribunal.184 
The ICTY and the ICTR do not share the same statutes, but did share a common 
prosecutor and a common appellate chamber until 2003, when they were 
administratively seperated. Cassese takes this as a sign for international criminal 
prosecution to be enclosed and administered in one permanent entity.185 The logistic 
expenditure induced by the tribunals has been enormous and the Security Counsil 
was fully occupied with administering them. Ad hoc tribunals require their new 
installment and have to act within narrow bounds concerning rationae tempore and 
materiae.186 The ICTs literally started from scratch187 and the difficulties experienced 
„demonstrate the fundamental inability of the SC to micro-manage action-oriented 
bodies that require constant attention to details.“188 This accounts as another 
argument for a permanent court: the selective erection of ad hoc tribunals that face a 
lot more administrative difficulties due to the fact that they don’t possess their own 
financial ressources and personnel will not be sufficient to cover the demand for 
international criminal jurisdiction.189 
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Towards the UN, the reproach of exercising malfeasance by erecting the tribunals 
was uttered. Others rate the establishment of the ad hoc tribunals - viewing it as a 
peacekeeping measure - as innovative.190 On the part of diplomats it was feared that 
the tribunals would hamper the already difficult situation in the field and interfere with 
ongoing efforts to end the violence.191 Further, the reproach of partiality against the 
Serbs was made in the wake of the ICTY.192 The fact that its establishment can be 
attributed to the Security Council, the reproach of executing victor’s justice doesn’t 
sustain. This, however, doesn’t change the fact that there is a democratic deficit to be 
spotted in the foundation of the tribunals: The ICTY was not proceeded by a 
constructive dialogue with the involved states concerning their submission of 
souvereignity. The vote as to whether or note a tribunal should be erected was made 
a decision of the Security Council as opposed to an election in a ‚one country – one 
vote’ fashion.193 Despotism and selectivity in terms of the whereabouts of ad hod 
tribunals were the main reproaches adressed in the matter of establishing non-
permanent international criminal courts. It has been considered unwise by the UN to 
establish special courts in certain regions of the world and not consider the 
impression of exercising selective justice that is thereby made. Both tribunals voice 
the selective approach wielded by the Security Counsil. Tribunals for Sierra Leone, 
Cambodia and East Timor had also been in debate. Sierra Leone had already had a 
draft for a tribunal in 2000, the situation in Cambodia and East Timor was similar: the 
UNTAET in East Timor installed committees that exercised exclusive jurisdiction over 
serious criminal offenses, including also crimes against humanity and genocide. Little 
attention was paid to these tribunals in the relevant literature. Further, it has 
frequently been laid to the ICTY’s charge that its jurisdiction functions as a figleaf 
placed in front of the most appalling crimes ever committed to divert from 
malfunctioning diplomatics and policits of the United Nations and the great powers.194 
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Considering the civil society, acceptance of the tribunals was widespread. They 
enjoyed recognition, attribution of fairness and credibility; international criminal 
jurisdiction has been endorsed in the world public opinion and by many governments. 
There is now more consensus in the international community over a permanent 
solution without the difficulties arising from the ad hoc tribunals.195 The manner in 
which they had been erected was rejected, but their basic outline basically agreed 
with.196 In the long run however, ad hoc tribunals will not be able to serve the 
purpose of consistent and just penalization due to their being subject to political 
contemplation.197 Their ill successes make the establishment of a permanent 
institution even more imperative.198 
The actions taken by the SC, when it initiated investigations for the first time since 
World War II, got the development of the ICC underway unlike anything else in the 
past.199 Hereunto Triffterer: „It was understood that the situation, shaped also by 
growing recognition and acceptance of the jurisprudence of the ICTY and the ICTR, 
had never been and probably would not be as favourable again for a long time.“200 
2.2.5 The International Criminal Court 
As a sign for the overcoming of the difficulties that had hindered international 
cooperation during the Cold War, after its peaceful settlement the UN renewed the 
assignment to the ILC to inspect the erection of an international criminal court.201 The 
process foregoing the UN World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna in 1993 was 
spiked with calls for an international criminal court.202 
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The idea of a permanent court was taken up in 1989 on behalf of a search for conflict 
resolution on the drug trafficking problem.203 The idea of a court to prosecute this 
particular crime was raised – and the task handed down to the ILC. At the same time 
a draft statute for a permanent international criminal court designed to prosecute all 
international crimes was created by an NGO committee.204 In 1990 this text was 
given to the Eighth United Nations Congress on Crime Prevention and the Treatment 
of Offenders, which thus led to the continuation of the establishment process. This 
then set off the development of several more draft statutes that in the end lead up to 
the adoption of the Rome Statute. The ILC drafted a statute in 1992, revised it again 
in 1993 and 1994. The latter was foremost designed to meet political requests of the 
major powers and thus abandoned its former inherent idealism in favor of more 
realistic turns. An ad hoc committee was appointed to debate the draft.205 The GA 
then unbuckled the Draft Code of 1991 from the 1994 Draft Statute for an 
International Criminal Court. It later brought the Preparatory Committee on the 
Establishment of an International Criminal Court into being in 1996, based on a 
report delivered by the Ad hoc Committee. Based on the ILC’s draft, the PrepCom 
began to alter it. Their final report was resubmitted to the GA with the request to give 
the PrepCom permission to negotiate in order to produce an even more reinforced 
text until 1998. The proposal was granted, and the PrepCom took up its work. In 
1997, the GA summoned the Rome Conference for June 1998 to finalize the 
establishment of the court.206 A draft code of crimes that, being a trade-off between 
outright objectors and firm advocates, lacked the support of many countries was 
provisionally adopted in 1991 by the ILC.207 
As a number of controversial issues were left unanswered for  the sheer impossibility 
of solving them within the PrepCom, debating them was moved to the Conference of 
Rome itself.208 A diplomatic conference of plenipotentiaries was held to agree on a 
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Statute.209 The treaty of Rome was finally negotiated in the period of June 15 until 
July 17 in 1998 by representatives of 160 countries. An alliance of in the end 
altogether 800 NGOs that merged into the Coalition for an International Criminal 
Court (CICC) and allied with the like-minded states had a crucial influence on the 
positive outcome of the founding process.210 The group of like-minded states 
involved around 60 states including, among others, the UK.211 At the end of five 
weeks of negotiations, the Statute was accepted in a vote of 120 to 7, with an 
abstention from voting of 21 countries.212 Hence, the ICC was supported by almost 
two thirds of the UN member states.213 Among others, China, Israel, India, Russia 
and the United States didn’t agree to the Statute.214 Art.8(2b)viii regulates the 
proclamation of  „the transfer, directly or indirectly, by the Occupying Power of parts 
of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies, or the deportation or 
transfer of all or parts of the population of the occupied territory within or outside this 
territory“215 as a war crime. Wedgwood marks this as a crucial reason for the USA 
and Israel, in particular, not to sign the treaty.216 Less powerful states have reacted 
with disappointment ranging to intolerance to the withdrawal of big players. The 
capability of the ICC to carry its purpose into effect is uncertain, given the unequal 
treatment resulting from this pull-out.217 
In June 2000, the Preparation Committee laid out a consenus agreement regulating 
the rules of procedure and evidence and the elements of crimes that need to be 
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proved before conviction.218 The Court’s Statutes entered into force on 1 July, 2002, 
after 60 states had ratified it.219 This was surprisingly early, as its becoming operative 
was decided and pronounced to be dependant on the pace of the contracts’ 
ratification in the signatory states.220  
It cannot be emphasized enough how the climate of willingness to compromise 
among the participating state-officials influenced the positive outcome of the 
conference: Knowing that refusal to cooperate by a small group of states would 
paralyze the efforts for a court and stall any further progress on it, delaying the issue 
to an unknown time in the future when the terms for its foundation had never before 
been so favourable.221 In the period from 1994 to 1997, many governments altered 
their attitude towards the idea of a court: Between 1982 and 1992 such a change in 
climate had been unthinkable.222 
Obviously, to understand the ICC’s development requires knowing the long history of 
the idea of this institution. Specifically when it comes to its peace-keeping intention, a 
historical outline elaborates the distinctive features that distinguish it from its 
predecessors. International Criminal Law has undergone a gradual development 
from an instrument of victor’s justice through to a medium for peace-keeping.223 „The 
Statute crystallizes the whole body of law that has gradually emerged over the past 
fifty years in the international community in this particular problematic area.“224 The 
coming into force of the ICC represents an institutionalization of international 
humanitarian law, as well as an approaching universalization of it. Through that, it 
can act as a symbol of justice. Whether it can live up to the expectations of being an 
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effective bearer of justice will depend on the political will.225 Negotiating the Court 
was rough and took a tremendous amount of time, compared to other conventions 
and agreements that attained semi-international acceptance much quicker. This 
explains also why the establishment of a permanent international criminal court has 
taken fifty years longer than the ratification of the Convention on Human Rights and 
the Genocide Convention.226 
3 The International Criminal Court 
The ICC will be resident in The Hague. Administratively it is composed of the 
presidium, the office of the chancellery, the prosecuting body and three departments: 
the Pre-Trial Division, the Trial Divison and the Appeals Divison. The divisions  are 
each divided into chambers consisting of three judges. Four judges and the President 
are appendant to the Appeals Division. The Chamber of the Prosecutor, led by the 
Prosecutor, is independent from the Court.227 However, the prosecutor has to get 
permission for initiating an investigation from a board of judges. This was installed to 
reduce the impact the prosecutor’s role can have, or in other words, to „check against 
any overly aggressive tendencies.“228 A total of 18 judges will be employed at the 
Court, with a tenure of office of nine years and no possibility of re-election. The ASP 
functions as a controlling organ for the Court and it will meet once a year. The 
financing of the Court will be undertaken by the member states and the UN. It can 
also receive additional voluntary payments by international organisations or other 
sources.229 
The Statute consists of 128 Articles and a preamble and regulates the crimes, the 
jurisdiction, the structure of the court, the penal procedure, and the cooperation with 
the states party to the treaty. Ratione personae (Art. 12) allots for automatic 
jurisdiction in cases where either the state of the alleged perpetrator or the state on 
whose territory the crime has been committed are parties to the treaty. Ratione 
materiae (Art. 5) regulates the crimes, involving genocide, crimes against humanity, 
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war crimes and the crime of aggression, subdivided into almost 70 elements of an 
offense.230 No consensus could be reached on the definiton of the crime of 
aggression, which is why the Court won’t be able to exercise its jurisdiciton over it.231 
Only crimes that have been committed after the entry into force of the Statute will fall 
under ist jurisdiction according to the principle nullum crimen, nulla poena sine 
lege.232 To comply with the legal requirements, grave breaches have to meet three 
requirements: „The conflict has to be armed, it has to be of international nature, and 
the act has to be adressed at protected persons or objects“.233 Crimes committed in 
internal armed conflicts will, as was established under debate, also fall under the 
definition of war crimes. This marks a hallmark, since internal armed conflicts make 
up the majority of conflicts in the world today.234 This was subject to heated debates 
in Rome, since the acknowledgement of the idea of crimes affecting only the internal 
business of a state was only reluctantly accepted.235 One particular renewal in the 
Rome Statute is the inclusion of crimes that can be considered as part of a plan or a 
political strategy, as well as in case of massive perpetration.236 However, Art. 124 
regulates that for a periof of seven years, states-parties can refuse to accept the 
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Court’s jurisdiction; a provision designed to give states time to adapt to the ICC’s 
regulations and train their military.237 
3.1 Main Problems 
The Statute of the ICC is a product of both a political and a juridical tug war. The 
implications that the agreement that was settled on will have depend a great deal on 
the possibilities legally granted in its framework, but not less on political scenarios. It 
doesn’t suffice to consider one of these two sides only. From a juridical point of view, 
the work is nearly done; the political work required for a successful tool for justice will 
constantly be necessary. The following chapter addresses the political questions 
arising from the legal regulations reached. 
It was decided to establish an independent court through a treaty. As a result, no 
amendments to the Charter of the UN were made and the Court will also not be 
financed through the regular UN budget.238 Being an independent organ, the ASP 
holds the responsibility for the Court. Nevertheless, the Court was regarded as 
connected with the UN. This was also taken up in the Statute, the exact definitions of 
their cooperations were later decided in an agreement.239 Frequently found in the 
scientific literature is the opinion that „(...) the function of the Court is considered to 
have intrinsic connection with the purposes of the UN, especially with the role of the 
Security Council.“240 This will be discussed broadly in Chapter 4.1.3. 
Roy Lee calls the statute ‚a product of give and take.’241 Others phrase it quite boldly 
by saying the ICC has „pre-natal shortcomings“.242 The many quite fundamentally 
opposing views on how much power the court should be given defined the result of 
the Rome Conference.243 The conference was torn between the maintenance of the 
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Court’s independence and the concern of states over their sovereignty that urged to  
keep the Court closely under state control. Finding a consensus broad enough to join 
60 states in it calls for compromises.244 The most well-known and controversial 
compromises will be discussed further in the upcoming chapters. The aim is to point 
out the distinct problems that arise from either solution and elaborate whether the 
independent well-functioning of the Court has been compromised. „Reflecting the 
trends of the Conference, the final package is consistent with the ‚like-minded 
cornerstones’ espoused by a clear majority of delegations, but with significant 
features to accommodate the strongly held views of other delegations.“245 
The successful operating of the ICC will be dependant on a larger number of factors: 
its relation to the states parties, that to the non-states parties, to the national courts 
and legal orders, as well as to the UN-System and specifically to the SC. Considered 
to be the most important, due to the amount of interference with the Court’s work it is 
granted, will be the relationship with the SC.246 
3.1.1 Complementarity 
As laid out in Art. 1 of the Statute, the Court’s jurisdiction shall be complementary to 
national jurisdictions.247 In other words, the Court’s jurisdiction will enhance national 
jurisdictions, not replace them. How the admissibility is regulated is described in Art. 
17: In the case of a state unwilling or unable to prosecute a crime that, in gravity, 
would fall under the Court’s jurisdiction, it takes over the case.248 The ICC will thus 
have a more complicated standing since it has to prove the national jurisdiction to be 
incapable or unwilling, compared to the ICTs whose jurisdiction had primacy over 
national courts. The authority and legitimacy of the ICTs was de facto, whereas the 
ICC has to newly decide over its admissibility in every single case. National courts 
and the ICC hence work antagonistically. Proving its legitimacy can be expected to 
turn out tedious, unless the government of the concerned state approves of the 
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Court’s jurisdiction and complies with it.249 The term complementarity is hence 
confusing, since it suggests a more favourable partnership, when in fact, the ICC will 
hamper national courts to a certain extent. Respectively, it also constitutes a mere 
substitution, since national jurisdictions enjoy priority until it is proven that they need 
to step back in a particular case.250 
The initiation of investigations may set out from the prosecutor, the SC, or any state 
party. The fact that the Prosecutor can initiate proceedings is essential for the Courts 
independence, since state parties as well as the SC are very likely to filter political 
considerations into their conduct with the Court. In order to control the Prosecutor, 
they need to get approval from the pre-trial chamber before preceding their 
investigation. In all other cases except referral from the SC, either the affected state 
on whose territory the crime has been committed or the state of the nationality of the 
indicted have to accept the jurisdiction of the Court in the case, which constitutes 
another major compromise made during the Conference of Rome. This acceptance is 
automatic for state Parties, with the exception of a temporary regulation allowing for a 
seven-year period of non-automatic consent to the Courts jurisdiciton, which is 
intended to grant the state Parties a period of acclimatization to the Court’s 
jurisdiction. Non-state Parties can too accept the Court’s jurisdiction.251 
The concept of complementarity moots a series of important issues. In order not to 
impinge upon the principle ne bis in idem252, the Court can only exercise its 
jurisdiction if the responsible national court fails to react. Furthermore, a person 
convicted by a national court for a capital offense cannot be indicted by the ICC. A 
case is also unaccusable if investigations or prosecutions have been made by 
national authorities, even if the outcome of the process was an acquittal. Likewise, a 
person convicted by the ICC cannot be put on trial by a national court in the same 
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matter.253 In the special case of a conviction followed by an amnesty the ICC is also 
not authorized to intervene254, unless the constitutional quality of the proceeding is 
doubted. The ne bis in idem principle will only be overridden if the interdiction of 
double jeopardy is being utilized in order to protect the convict from prosecution 
through an independent court.255 Whether a genuine prosecution has taken place is 
ultimately decided by the Court.256 A number of states supported the case of a 
significantly weaker court, suggesting that once „any state had assumed jurisdiction, 
irrespective of its subsequent conduct“257, it should be granted jurisdiction. Such a 
court would literally have been useless, since protecting individuals from prosecution 
would have been made facile.258 So states do give up on sovereignty, despite a 
number of available loopholes. „In joining the court, they agree to be bound by a 
process with defined rules but no guarantees.“259 
The concept of complementary jurisdiction was proposed by the ILC in its draft in 
1994. Many have criticized it heavily, among them former prosecutor of the ICTY and 
ICTR Louise Arbour. Since the legal order of a least developed country is most likely 
not as elaborate as that of a more developed country, this construction could easily 
be unfavourable towards the former. Proving the legal system of an LDC to be 
ineffective and thus unable will, applying higher developed standards, not be much of 
a challenge. This provision could easily be interpreted as disadvantageous for poor 
countries and beneficial to richer, yet corrupt or malfunctioning states with a fully 
developed legal order.260 This construction of the concept of complementarity could 
thus lead to an asymmetrical usage of the Court. Analogue to the dominance of 
power on national levels, critics suspect a likewise line of action on the international 
level. ‚Rogue states’ as well as less developed ones run into danger of having 
delinquency attributed to them rather than to the more powerful members of the 
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international community.261 The ICC’s jurisdiction will span over more than 100 
countries, of which not all share a common or comparable legal order. It seems that 
this regulation provokes an uneven treatment, even more so, it could impinge upon 
some national legal systems with unforeseen and disproportionate severity.262 In 
three of the four cases the ICC is currently investigating, all situated on the African 
continent, the states themselves asked the Court to intervene. The concerned states, 
the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Uganda signed 
and ratified the Statute of Rome. Opinions differ on whether or not the Court’s 
emphasis is rightfully concentrated on Africa solely. Ms. Fatou Bensouda, deputy to 
the chief prosecutor, defends this by saying that Africa constitutes the most gravely 
deprived area and is thus rightfully the focal point of the Court’s action, at least at the 
moment.263 Considering that Sudan presents the only case in which the Court 
intervened unsolicitedly, the reproach of the principle of complementarity affecting 
less developed countries doesn’t sustain, at least not yet. It will be necessary to 
observe the ICC’s future work in order to evaluate the question of fairness that is 
raised by the principle of complementarity. 
3.1.2 The Status of the Individual 
The ICC’s jurisdiction can be initiated, as elaborated in the previous chapter, by 
either the SC, the chief prosecutor in accordance with the pre-trial chamber, or any 
state party. An indictment via an individual is not precluded and could take place via 
the prosecutor who starts investigations after taking notice of the individual, but is 
also not explicitly designated as a manner in which prosecution is triggered.264  
International criminal jurisdiction in its present form thus embodies a structurally 
authoritarian judiciary that is detached from the social basis. It obliges the individual 
to stick to certain norms without granting it the possibility to engage the law that binds 
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them for their own purpose. The individual can be prosecuted, but cannot induce 
prosecution. On the other hand, the statutory offenses of the ICC are not newly 
criminalized: all four categories of crimes are acknowledged as crimes according to 
the law of nations.265 Some states even pronounced against the prosecutor’s right to 
initiate investigations solely in accordance with the pre-trial chamber. If their wish had 
prevailed, the individual would have been entirely detained from entering the process 
of international criminal jurisdiction.266 
The chosen direction reflects the trend of the development of the law of nations. 
While states continue to form the mainly addressed parties in the law of nations, 
NGOs and international organisations such as the WTO have gained in legal 
importance. The status of individuals has increasingly been enhanced from being 
mere objects in the law of nations to being enabled to address international bodies 
directly in order to assert their claims when their rights have been violated. According 
to constructivism, gradually a variety of actors rise to form the international 
community, replacing the dominant realist picture of a state-only arena.267 
The strengthening of the individual’s position is a direct consequence of the upsurge 
of human rights which have influenced every field of international law.268 These 
rights, however, remain indirect, since the individual is still dependant on its state to 
acknowledge its rights within international treaties and conventions.269 „At the end of 
the day it is still states which sign the treaties.“270 The position of the individual thus 
changed from the position of being protected without having the possiblity of seizing 
the initiative, to being individually criminally liable. The growing concern for the 
individual is closely linked with the growing concern for the victims. The evolution of a 
global conscience has set off the understanding of human rights as essential; 
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criminal justice is a coherent measure in this enforcement process.271 The individual 
doesn’t reach an equal position within the framework of the ICC, but the opportunities 
given to victims in the framework of the ICC are still bigger than in previous 
arrangements, as will be discussed further in chapter 5.1.2.  Also on the part of the 
accused, the legal framework has come a long way since the trials after World War II 
to ensure fair trials.272 
3.1.3 The Role of the Security Council 
How the relationship between the SC and the Court should function ideally has been 
a highly debated point on the agenda for the establishment of a permanent 
international criminal court. The question as to how the relationship should be 
established touches on the matter of the fine line between peace and security in the 
sense of the UN Charter. The  amount of power that ought to be given to the SC was 
– as mentioned before - broadly discussed in Rome, also in view of the far more 
widespread control it enacted over the ICTY and ICTR. The resistance to give the SC 
more powers – also in terms of enforcement – though, was very big, resulting in the 
regulation that was settled on.273 The compromise was called Singapore 
compromise, based on a proposal made by Singapore.274 Roy Lee calls the chosen 
path ‘a twin approach’275 in which both institutions can assist each other. 
Berman suggests that the ICC’s relationship to the SC can be described as 
consisting of three pillars: the positive, the negative, and the hidden pillar, regulated 
in Art. 13(b), Art. 16 and Art. 5. The relationship of the two will form around these 
pillars.276 The first pillar is embodied in Art. 13 which entitles the SC to refer a 
situation to the prosecutor. Art. 13(b), regulating the exercise of jurisdiction, arranges 
the following: „A situation in which one or more of such crimes appears to have been 
committed is referred to the Prosecutor by the Security Council acting under Chapter 
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VII of the Charter of the United Nations.“277 Thus, the SC is entitled, third next to 
referral by a state party or initiation of investigation by the Prosecutor, to instruct the 
Court to take actions.278 This is “to empower the Court, not the Council.“279 The 
spheres of politics and law still remain separated, as the SC refers a situation, not a 
case. The SC thus refers a situation to the prosecutor, who, on this basis, begins to 
investigate. This way the independence of the prosecutor is preserved, whether 
charges are made stays only in their competence to decide (given the approval of the 
pre-trial chamber).280  The fact that the SC has been given that much power could be 
of great help to the Court: In cases of referral through the SC, it is entitled to make 
use of enforcement measures under Chapter VII of the Charter: all member states of 
the UN would then have to subject to UN orders.281 This provision is indeed as 
controversial as it sounds. Further discussion on it will follow in Chapter 4.2.1. 
Meanwhile, for the opposite case the SC has been given regulatory powers over the 
Court as well. If the SC considers its own activities as paramount to those of the 
Court, it can stall the Court’s activities.282 This entitlement to request deferral 
constitutes the negative pillar. The deferral of investigation or prosecution is 
regulated in Art. 16, stating that „no investigation or prosecution may be commenced 
or proceeded with under this Statute for a period of 12 months after the Security 
Council, in a resolution adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United 
Nations, has requested the Court to that effect; that request may be renewed by the 
Council under the same conditions.“283 The request for deferral affects both 
investigations that were about to be made as well as prosecutions that are already 
being proceeded.284 Art. 16 was established on the basis of doubts issued by the 
permanent members of the SC regarding the question of authority in international 
peace-keeping and peace-establishment. While the SC intents to work on diplomatic 
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resolutions of conflicts, the Court’s mission is to clarify the facts.285 Critical voices 
thus demanded to assign the SC the competence to automatically exclude the 
Court’s jurisdiction.  
The SC thus has the power to force the Court to subject to it, if it regards this as 
necessary in order to preserve or establish peace.286 This approach reflects the view 
that the SC, in its function as the highest international institution designed to guard 
worldwide peace and security, must have priority over the ICC and other institutions 
established in order to attain the same goal.287 A court is designed to establish 
peace, hence, it should not get in conflict with the institution that predominantly aims 
for this goal.288 The SC’s power within the Statute of the Court is justified by the 
following advantages resulting from it: The SC can refrain from establishing ad hoc 
tribunals whenever a situation requires UN action. On the other hand, it gives the 
prosecutor a profound back-up when starting the investigations.289 According to 
Louise Arbour, former prosecutor of the ICTs, the prosecutor will need this 
empowerment through the SC badly: She evaluates the powers the prosecutor of the 
ICC derives from the Statute as fairly limited. According to Arbour, the Prosecutor will 
have better perspectives when investigating on behalf of the SC in order to be able to 
investigate adequatly at all. In fact, referrals by the SC could be of advantage to the 
Court: being backed up by the SC, the Court can expand its jurisdiction, let alone the 
augmenting effect a close cooperation will have on the financial resources of the 
ICC.290 
However, the relationship between the SC and the Court bears the possibility of 
being politically charged. The permanent members of the SC are clearly given a 
more privileged position than all other states. Even more so, since Art. 16 empowers 
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the SC and thus the same states to ward off charges.291 A positive resolution to 
request a deferral is required, which smoothed ruffled feelings among the states not 
in favour of this asymmetric solution. If one of the permanent members makes use of 
their right to veto a deferral of investigation, the process can proceed.292 For the 
opposite case of a referral of a situation to the ICC a voting majority in the SC is 
necessary.293 Hence, the issue of the court’s independence is touched. The voting 
system and the hierarchy within the UN and the SC advise against the 
implementation of this already existing organ as authority over enforcement.294 „The 
abuse of the veto has, for many years, frustrated all hopes to consider the Council as 
the custodian for the application of the rule of law.“295 And further, up until the 
present, the Five „are against all forms of limitations on the veto including the call for 
any form of norm setting and faithful application of the rules of the procedure of the 
Council.“296 
Higgins mentions that the compromises made in the Statute provide for a much 
weaker function of the SC in the Court than what had been originally planned.297. 
Already the ILC had been unsure about how to regulate these relations: in its draft 
the ILC had envisioned a restraint for the Court to follow investigations in matters that 
were on the agenda of the SC, suggesting an “automatic bar on commencing a 
prosecution arising from a situation being dealt with by the SC under Chapter VII of 
the Charter, unless the Council itself decided otherwise.”298 This would have meant a 
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complete gridlock on the Court’s activity. States would have been given the 
opportunity to abuse the law by putting a matter on the agenda in order to protect it 
from investigation. Considering that the permanent members have the right to veto, 
matters could have remained on the agenda forever. This regulation would have 
made the Court a pawn in the hands of the powerful and reduced it to absurdity, 
considering that neither would it have been impartial nor independent. Art. 16 
constitutes a major improvement compared to earlier drafts.299 The US suggested a 
veto power for all permanent members of the SC over prosecutions, which would 
have meant the ultimate death blow for the Court in its purpose to work 
independently and effectively. The only conflicts that would ever be solved by such a 
court would involve the few countries on earth that are not protected by either of the 
five major powers. Further, of course, these major powers would be granted impunity 
authorized by the law in force, which would amount to a disastrous and almost 
ridiculous injustice.300 
The entire debate raises one specific question: Should the Court be given the 
possibility to surpass the Security Council’s power? It must be admitted that criminal 
prosecution might not always be in the interest of a remedy for the conflict.301 Given 
the case that the ICC required permission by the SC to initiate investigations, as so 
desired by the US, the Court would be less torn between its inherent duty to punish 
the perpetrators of certain crimes and not to intervene in processes of transformation 
that could be disrupted and thrown back in their development. Of course, if that were 
the case, the ICC’s would fulfill its duty to create justice in a completely selective and 
arbitrary manner.302 Nevertheless, the asymmetric distribution of power in the 
international relations continues throughout the structure of the ICC. The regulations 
in Art. 16 and Art. 13 do give the permanent members of the SC a touch of possible 
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impunity or at least a better chance at it.303 In many respects the debate about the 
competence of the SC in the ICC was a conflict between the permanent members of 
the SC and all other states.304 It follows the tradition of ‚All states are equal, but some 
are more equal’. However, the UK, being a permanent member of the SC and a 
major world power, prominently engaged itself in the group of like-minded states in 
favour of a strong court. Minimal powers for the SC were postulated by various 
developing states.305  
Frankly, the SC itself is an organ with immense capacities for political play-offs. 
Establishing it as a serious and capable instrument of international politics engaged a 
long period of time. The Cold War has shown that an entirely disempowered SC will 
block any progress in the international arena, specifically in the field of international 
criminal prosecution. Weaving a new institution dedicated to international security 
and justice into the already existing architecture seems to be sound. The price for 
this scenario is inevitably at least better chances at impunity for specific powerful 
states, however, having precisely these states on board will give the ICC more 
coverage. Still, the fact that with the current compromise members of the SC are 
given the power to press charges and block investigations while themselves not 
being accountable does amount to a situation very contrary to reason. 
A coordinated performance between the ICC and the UN would be desirable. By 
reaffirming the principles of the UN Charter in the Statute of Rome and the powers 
that were attributed to the SC in Art. 13 and Art. 16, it appears a solid groundwork for 
a good cooperation was laid. For an effective work of the ICC the connecting link to 
the SC is seemingly essential. The UN can act as a donor of moral support as well as 
material support. From an administrative point of view, the ASP can meet in the UN 
headquarters, and further financing of the Court partly resides with the UN. The ICC 
can be made more effective through this backup of the UN. The procecutor will have 
less of a hard lot investigating in areas where UN peacekeeping missions are 
stationed. The UN can grant the implementation of ICC measures, both in cases of a 
reluctant member state as well as through ongoing support of the Court. The 
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connection between these institutions seems necessary for the ICC to be able to fulfil 
its purpose.306 
Regarding the patronage of the SC, many scholars expect the SC to empower the 
Court and the Prosecutor in cases of referral through Art. VII of the Charter in order 
not to let the ICC become weaker than the ad hoc tribunals. In this way, a dynamic of 
cooperation and compliance should be achieved.307 Others, on the other hand, 
consider support for the ICC through the SC a very unlikely scenario. The potential 
does exist, but should not be overestimated.308 Political tactics by permanent 
members of the SC have attributed unsteady support to the ICTY as well, thus it is 
hardly imagineable that the ICC should have a different fate. Especially interesting is 
the aspect of the US in the SC. Will it refer situations to the ICC when the USA will 
act as a logjam? There has been a change in the climate of the SC, but it sustained 
„its role as a bulwark of the international rule of law.”309 Broomhall goes as far as 
saying that the ICC is not even granted the doubtful support of the SC. 
3.2 The USA and the ICC 
Almost all major powers outside of Europe refused to sign the Statute of Rome. The 
American opposition, however, is particularly extraordinary, since all of America’s 
allies support it. Moreover, the USA has proven to be an advocate of human rights 
and put a lot of weight and money in the process of exporting its values, especially 
throughout the recent administrations. One line of argument assumes that 
international contributions to security must be in favour of American security politics, 
since they denote a boost for American security as well.310 However, the US feels it 
holds a special position being the only superpower and thus exposed to a larger-
than-average amount of danger that uncontrolled hatred could be focused on it.311 
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The basis of the divide the ICC has produced with the US are two very distinct views 
on enforcement policies for human rights. While the Court exemplifies a collective 
model, the US prefer a unidirectional enforcement strategy.312 Buzzwords such as 
‚sovereignty’ and ‚constitutionality’ are chipped into the discourse about the ICC to 
outplay it.313 Ruth Wedgwood has, along with other authors, defended the American 
view on the ICC, listing the reasons that keep the USA from supporting the newfound 
Court. She lists „the problem of amnesties in democratic transitions, the necessary 
role of the Security Council in UN security architecture (...) the role of consent as a 
treaty principle and third party jurisdiction, the handling of treaty amendments, and 
the inclusion of ‚aggression’ as a crime with no agreement on its definition“, as well 
as „the necessary role of the United States in providing effective enforcement of ICC 
judgements“314 as the main problems demanding further improvement. 
Clinton and former foreign minister Albright envisioned themselves as pioneers for a 
permanent court in 1997 but reversed their views.315 The treaty was signed by the 
USA under the Clinton Administration on the last day it was open for signature, 
December 31, 2000, who nevertheless dissuaded his successor from ratifying it.316 
Calling the american approach to the ICC under Clinton ‚cautious engagement’, the 
Bush Administration’s position towards it can be best described with ‚outright 
opposition’317 or ‚undisguised hostility.’318 The deferral of investigation or prosecution 
according to Art. 16 was misapplied by the US in July 2002, days after the entering 
into force of the Statute. By announcing to veto every upcoming peacekeeping 
missions unless the SC would make use of its power under Art. 16 and exclude 
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persons, whose state had not ratified the Statute, and who were involved in missions 
authorised by the UN itself from prosecution by the Court, it railroaded Res. 1422.319 
Res. 1422 had been adopted 15-0, after the US had threatened to withdraw its 
peacekeeping troops from Bosnia.320 In many legal opinions, this resolution 
constitutes “an ugly example of bullying by the United States, and a considerable 
stain on the credibility of the Security Council.“321 The UK and France also signed 
bilateral agreements with Afghanistan to protect their peacekeeping nationals from 
prosecution through the Court. However, these agreements are more limited than the 
American one, which includes also government officials and contract workers.322  
After Bush withdrew Clinton’s signature, congress passed the ‚American 
Servicmembers’ Protection Act of 2002’ (ASPA) which blocks the participation of 
American citizens in peacekeeping operations in countries that have ratified the 
treaty, as well as cancels military aid to states-parties if they don’t agree to sign a 
bilateral immunity agreement (BIA) with the US on the non-extradition of US citizens 
to the ICC. Further, ASPA regulates military operations to intervene in cases with US 
citizens in ward at the ICC. A number of such bilateral treaties has already been 
established.323 The question as to whether it is even possible for a state to sign a 
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bilateral treaty with the US agreeing not to extradite its citizens to the Court without 
breaching international law is being examined by scholars. In case of a surrender 
request to the Court,  the US could infringe on the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties.324 The US counters this by drawing upon Art. 98(2) of the Rome Statute 
that was designed with regard to existing agreements.325 In fact, however, not the 
question of how to interpret Art. 98(2) is the real problem, but the legitimacy of the 
Court altogether that is being circumvented by this attempt.  
The European countries immediately took an unequivocal stand on this issue by 
agreeing not to sign such a treaty.326 Even future EU-states, though small, such as 
Latvia and Slovenia, have withheld their cooperation to the US in order to comply 
with the then ongoing EU-application process.327 „Aspirant countries must follow the 
club's rules“328, so a European Union spokesman on the issue. The US explicitly 
threatened the EU, in particular candidate countries from the former Eastern Block.329 
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The actual benefit of these agreements is not known, they „seem to flout international 
law merely to show who is master.“330 A few European Countries suggested they 
would accept the US approach, if the US undertook a sign to demonstrate that this 
would not be equal to granting impunity. Still, even if the US augured to investigate 
and prosecute possible perpetrators, the ICC’s authority and legitimacy would 
nonetheless be openly peached, as it circumvents its main purpose: to be able to 
control national governments in their handling of these major crimes. Without 
acceptance of the US for that principle, its efforts to claim validity of Art. 98(2) for its 
endeavour constitutes a demand for impunity for American citizens.331As a 
comparable example for a compromise in such issues qualifies the matter of murder 
suspects extradited to the US: This so happens in many cases only under the 
condition of the non-appliance of the death penalty; something the US shrinks from 
doing so but still agrees to.332 So similarly, the US could recognize the jurisdiction of 
the ICC and understand that no state can, with a clear conscience, extradite a US 
convict to the US when a feigned prosecution is to be expected.333 
To the observer, a reticent attitude of the court towards the USA concerning possible 
criminal activity in the ongoing war in Iraq is apparent; an approach also advised 
throughout much of the relevant literature.334 Richard Perle, chairman of the Defense 
Policy Board Advisory Committee from 2001 to 2003 under the Bush administration, 
publicly admitted that the war against Iraq infringed on international law and many 
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scholars are of the opinion that the war constituted a crime of aggression. This crime 
however, as mentioned before, lacks a definition. Therefore, no action can be 
expected before 2010 when the review conference will be held and amendments to 
the Statute could be made. It is still open whether the US will attend this conference 
in order to join negotiations over possible further directions the Court will take on 
issues such as drugtrafficking and terrorism that are up for decision.335 
In the past, the USA were widely supportive of the establishment of the ICTY and 
ICTR.336 These tribunals are generally viewed as predecessors leading to the 
establishment of a permanent court, in the process of which the USA were similarly 
intensively integrated.337 During the Cold War, the US were highly in favor and 
involved in the regularization of the international sphere, a strategy to keep the 
Soviets under control.338 These current attempts to undermine the legitimacy of the 
ICC sends the signal to the world, that the US doesn’t accept international law if it 
doesn’t suit their purpose, and that the US will make use of their powerful standing to 
show this.339 Schabas argues that, „in practice, Res. 1422 will probably not prove to 
be a serious obstacle to the fulfilment of the Court’s solemn mission.“340 How much of 
a stumbling block it will de facto constitute will turn out in the Court’s future work. 
What Res. 1422 unequivocally signalizes, though, is that the USA stands firm on its 
self-conception of a superpower that moves outside of the arena. Objections to the 
Court by the USA were explained with concerns to the national security and public 
law and order.341 Naturally, by ratifying the Statute, the ICC is given the power to 
interfere in the law and order of states, but, to the same degree in all states. By 
excluding itself from a concession a great number of states agreed to make, it 
demands its own rules for itself. The biggest harm resulting from this is of a symbolic 
kind. As elaborated in Chapter 1.1.9, the Arab League immediately united behind 
Sudan’s president al-Bashir in an attempt to defend what they perceived as an 
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unequal treatment. To criticize that international law makes Sudan discharge its 
duties while ignoring the war in Iraq and the politics of Israel in the near east is fair 
enough. Most of all, due to US support for al-Bashir’s indictment. Not letting itself be 
bound by the ICC but supporting its approach in other countries is a position that, not 
very surprisingly, is met with criticism around the world.342 
Regarding the interaction of the ICC with the SC, Wedgwood argues that the latter is 
not given an adequately significant role in the Statute and thus in the Court, 
respectively that at the Court’s formation the existing ‚security architecture’ within the 
United Nations has been neglected. She further criticizes that the decision as to 
whether or not justice has to step back in order not to endanger the peace process 
should not be made, prudential and plain political as the answer needs to be, by the 
Prosecutor. She claims that it seems the whole issue of democratic transitions was 
left untouched in the Statute, although it is of substantial importance when trying to 
settle fundamental disputes that have led to large-scale crimes. This is specifically 
important in matters settled in areas where international law is only just getting 
started or unclear. Calling this interference with the powers of the SR pretentious, 
Wedgwood fears that „the wish for an independent criminal court may have come at 
the expense of the Council’s role in peace and security, and so grave a derogation 
may be too profound for a five-week conference to consider with proper reflection.“343 
This is particularly controverse considering that the authority held by the SC in 
matters of international peace is crystal clear when it comes to the GA and the ICJ: 
for both, it is not in their competence to act in a matter when this matter is either, for 
the GA, upon the Council’s agenda, or, for the ICJ, when the SC has acted under 
Chapter VII of the Charter.344 However, the reproach of the ICC interfering gravely 
with the security politics of the UN doesn’t fully sustain. The SC can refer cases to 
the Court as well as suspend investigations.345 To give it even more control over the 
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ICC, „would result in the Security Council exercising a dominating function rather 
than merely a significant one.“346 
The SCs allegedly only very limited powers to intervene in the Court’s proceedings is, 
along with the other flaws in the Statute, interpretated by American critics as the 
result of the rushed establishment of the Statutes in a five-week conference.347 This 
argument has to be countered by recalling the long history of commissions working 
on drafts for a possible international criminal court, especially the contribution of the 
PrepCom which spent over three years compounding over the interaction between 
the SR and the ICC.348 The reached compromise is recorded in the Articles 13 and 
16, further in Art. 53 (2) and (3),  87(5) and (7).349 The PrepCom left a number of 
issues openly unsolved until the Conference in Rome, however, a comparable 
number of controversial issues had been successfully solved in the process that led 
to Rome. Among others, complementarity accounts for such an issue, as well as the 
relationship of the Court to national legal orders. For the issues that were left open 
the PrepCom prepared possible solutions in order to be able to accelerate the finding 
of a compromise in Rome.350 
3.2.1 Third-Party Jurisdiction 
In the case of a referral, the otherwise necessary conditions in order to trigger the 
ICC’s exercise of jurisdiction are no longer required. The controversial aspect arising 
from this regulation is the fact that since the SC acts within Art. VII of the Charter, its 
decisions are binding in every state that ratified the UN Charter. Thus, the Court’s 
jurisdiction is subordinated to the powers of the SC and hence legally enforceable 
under valid international law. This means that even states that didn’t ratify the Statute 
fall under the Court’s jurisdiction in cases that the SC referred to the Court.351 The 
arrest warrant issued for Sudan’s president al-Bashir is the result of this regulation; 
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after intensive lobbying of human rights groups and NGOs, the SC referred the 
situation in Darfur to the chief prosecutor.352 
This is tangent to the prohibition of third-party jurisdiction. The SC could refer a 
situation in which neither the state of the accused, nor the state on whose territory 
the crime has been committed, are parties to the Treaty. Naturally, a lot of 
advantages for the Court arise from this regulation, for example an empowerment of 
the Court’s possibilities in internal armed conflicts such as in Sudan.353 Essentially, it 
makes sense that precisely states likely to commit large-scale crimes will probably 
rather not sign the Statute of Rome and therefore elude international criminal 
prosecution.354 States critical of the alignment of the ICC with the SC put forth that 
this connection is in violation of the law of nations. Former prosecutor of the ICTY 
and ICTR, Louise Arbour, argues that the SC doesn’t derive power from the Statute 
that it doesn’t already obtain from the Charter.355 However, she also acknowledges 
that by referring situations to the Court and affecting third-party states, the law of 
treaties and thus regulations of the UN Charter and practice  is disobeyed. 
The reproach towards the SC of acting ultra vires by violating the principle of third-
party jurisdiction in these premises sustains. However, by imposing its will on states 
in order to achieve prosecution, the SC reacts to neglect of contractual commitments 
that the states have made outside of the ICC. The right and duty to punish grave 
breaches or extradite a convicted person to another country where they will be 
prosecuted results from the GC and AP II.356 Furthermore, the Convention on 
Genocide, ratified by more than a hundred states by now, obliges the parties to the 
treaty to punish genocide.357 For a number of other crimes, such as hijacking, air 
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piracy and others, the passed conventions include the obligation to prosecute or 
extradite an accused person.358 So to a certain extent it could be argued that the SC 
merely acts in its function to guard the maintenance of international peace and 
security. If this peace and security is compromised, the SC interferes, merely using 
the ICC as a tool it has on hand.  
The third-party jurisdiction resulting from the alliance between the SC and the ICC is 
yet the smaller problem, especially for the USA, since it possesses the right to veto 
and thus to block referrals disadvantageous to it. Much more objection was raised 
due to the provisions in Art. 12(2) that regulate the Court’s exercise of jurisdiction. 
According to it, „the Court may exercise its jurisdiction if one or more of the following 
States are Parties to this Statute (...) 
(a) The State on the territory of which the conduct in question occurred or, if the 
crime was committed on board a vessel or aircraft, the State of registration of that 
vessel or aircraft;  
(b) The State of which the person accused of the crime is a national.“359 
The objections to this regulation are obvious and, to a very big extent, justified: It 
does infringe on the Law of Treaties to bind a third-state against their will. However, 
given the basic aim of the ICC, by regulating its jurisdiction differently it would have 
completely missed the mark. The goal of an international court is obviously to create 
a universal jurisdiction. Jurisdiction is characterized by exercising a somewhat 
binding force on reluctant members of society: appearing in front of the court is not 
optional. The binding force that results from jurisdiction in national states is accepted 
and tolerated as long as it withstands certain criteria that prove its independence and 
fidelity to the rule of law. Given the logical fact that an international criminal court 
needs to be able to exercise its jurisdiction internationally, the same pattern of 
explanation can be applied. If the Court’s jurisdiction is limited to international crimes, 
and further the national court primary in charge has to fail to react in order for the ICC 
to become authorized to do so, objections to the ICC should be clarified.360 On the 
other hand, the ICC needs to be careful not to interfere with states’ possibilities to 
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settle their disputes peacefully in order not to gamble away a principled positive 
attitude with a hasty pressing ahead that is interpreted as attempted intimidation. 
Wedgwood further calls the alleged foundation in consent the lynchpin of the Statute 
of Rome. True that, the way it is, „it is not perfect, from anyone’s perspective.“361 By 
building the ICC on a mulitlateral treaty rather than have it erected by the Security 
Council it should be guaranteed that member states explicitly agreed to its 
foundation. Third-party jurisdiction is contradictatory to this. The USA worry that this 
gives ill-intentioned critics the chance to harm it.362 Further, reasoning was based on 
the fact that this regulation constitutes a breach of the Vienna Convention on the Law 
of Treaties, whilst international treaties are generally not looked upon with as binding 
by the USA anyway. 
The road of consent was not chosen, so the other side, because a compromise 
would have had to be bought over the most basic principles of fairness, going so far 
as to even compromise the Court in its purpose as a whole. The US proposal to 
include the right to veto a prosecution for all permanent members of the SC serves 
as a good example. The opposition to the US approach led to an attitude of „better 
no court at all (...) than one so fatally flawed.“363 In the end, US support couldn’t be 
achieved without a sellout on important values, which is why the international 
community in support of the ICC went on without it.364 
3.2.2 Peacekeepers under Fire? 
Considering the status of peacekeeping-missions under the jurisdiction of the ICC, 
much concern has been expressed. Especially American peacekeeping troops are 
stationed in many countries „and so clearly and even uniquely the targets of hatred 
and antipathy, that the court's mission of trying alleged perpetrators of genocide or 
war crimes could be twisted for political purposes to punish them wrongly.“365 Extra 
regulations were arranged for peacekeeping missions to prevent intentional abuse of 
the Court’s power to harm states actively involved in peacekeeping. Art. 8(2)(b)(iii) 
declares “intentionally directing attacks against personnel, installations, material, 
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units or vehicles involved in a humanitarian assistance or peacekeeping mission in 
accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, as long as they are entitled to the 
protection given to civilians or civilian objects under the international law of armed 
conflict“366 a war crime. Furthermore, existing agreements concerning peace-keeping 
missions and the security regulations applicable to them are not affected by the 
regulations provided by the Statute. And in general, the principle of complementarity 
doesn’t allow for the Court to take over jurisdiciton if the affected state is willing to do 
so itself.367 In theory, members of peace-keeping missions of non-states Parties 
could be indicted in front of the ICC, but considering that peace-keeping has been 
regulated on national levels so far, there is no concern for this to change. Arbour 
furthermore argues that states are in possession of other means to prevent the arrest 
of their peace-keeping nationals.368 As mentioned above, the UK and France signed 
bilateral agreements with Afghanistan to protect their peacekeeping forces from 
prosecution through the ICC.369 The United States secured the immunity of its troops 
using Res. 1422, which goes a lot further than the measurements taken by the UK 
and France, as mentioned earlier in Chapter 4.2.   
The problem is that this blackmailing of the USA could not be ignored. The USA is 
immensely pivotal in multinational peacekeeping measures. Peacekeeping at its 
momentary level would most certainly not be maintainable after a backdraw of the 
United States.370 
3.2.3 The Problem of Enforcement – Prospective Scenarios for Cooperation 
The question of enforcement of the ICCs decisions draws a disillusioning picture of 
the de facto possibilities that have been created through this new institution. Except 
when a situation is referred to the ICC by the SC, the de facto work of the Court will 
be difficult.371 Nor does the Court itself have it in its power to arrest defendants on 
their territory, consequently neither to extradite them. The same is true for searching 
and putting evidence in impoundment (seize and search). Neither can the ICC 
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summon witnesses. In these and other respects the Court is completely dependant 
on cooperation. 372 Malicious tongues scornfully call the Court ‚a giant without arms 
and legs who needs artificial limbs to walk and work.’ 373 Without an executive 
apparatus the ICC is totally dependent on cooperation.374  
Cooperation in criminal affairs between states usually follows the principle of 
voluntariness. Apart from obligations resulting from treaties or other commitments, 
there is no rule of costumary international law dictating compulsory cooperation. 
Swart lists sovereignty, equality, reciprocity, mutual interests if existent, and the 
necessity to protect individuals from unjust treatment by the other state as the main 
aspects governing cooperation between states in criminal affairs. In the case of 
extradition treaties there is mostly accordance in both legal orders as to whether the 
commited act is a crime. Cooperation between states can thus be characterized as 
horizontal, as opposed to the vertical cooperation between states.375 At least this is 
true in theory, since ultimately the Court has the decisive power over rights and 
duties arising for states-parties, a regulation that doesn’t form part of intra-state law 
of nations.376 State cooperation is crucial for investigations, arrest warrants and other 
necessary steps in the prosecution process. The ICC imposes these duties on the 
states in art. 86.377 
However, in the case of a reluctant state, the prospects are limited, as seen in the 
case of Sudan’s President al-Bashir. If the concerned state doesn’t cooperate, the 
international communtiy is in demand. The recourse to aids such as political, military 
or economic sanctions or other methods to pressure the unwilling state must be 
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possible for the Court. Otherwise, its hands are tied.378 In case of a non-cooperating 
party-state, decisions on further proceedings are made in the ASP or in the SC in 
cases referred to the ICC by the SC, respectively. Since there is no fixed code of 
conduct in such cases, decisions will be based on diplomatic, political and strategic 
considerations.379 States will naturally “factor their national interest into the 
enforcement question.“380 Political pressure will thus be required to enforce required 
actions of a reluctant state. 
In case of non-compliance to the duties arising from the Statute, the party-states are  
entitled to sue the seceded state for breach of contract in front of the ICJ. Such a 
lawsuit could quickly trouble the international community, especially if the concerned 
state refuses to acknowledge the verdict. Not only would the political costs of this 
endeavour be very high, it would also require the involvement of powerful states to 
be promising. Otherwise such a conflict on the international level could lead to an 
endangerment of the international peace, which would give the SC the capacity to 
take action based on Chapter VII of the Charter.381 This political pressure won’t 
constantly be available to the same extent, but subject to contemporary situations. 
The rule of law would require for this pressure to be exerted permanently.382 
In order to make a decision on whether or not to comply with decisions of the ICC, 
states will weigh the costs resulting from both scenarios: sanctions depict negative 
costs, while the self-interest of the states to enforce international legally binding 
norms would constitute the motive for compliance.383 This is even true in realist 
theoretical thinking, since a strong international legal system can be an option for 
less powerful states to ensure their standing. Constructivist thinking claims that „law 
is most persuasive when it is created through processes of mutual construction by a 
wide range of participants in a legal system,“ certain standards are adapted and only 
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reluctantly given up after that. In case of non-compliance, punishment for misconduct 
enjoys far back reaching historical legitimacy in most cultures. The approval rate of 
the ICC so far indicates a similarly good outlook for it to become an integrative force 
for legal norms: cultural structures that enjoy legitimacy have the biggest chance at 
being fundamentally internalized.384 
The ICC can act as a promotor of accountability. If accountability is introduced into 
the international relations, political pressure can easierly be regularized. Some 
reluctant states will, nevertheless, not be persuaded to cooperate. Many cases might 
require the use of force, often disguised as peacekeeping operations. Broomhall 
regards it as very likely that international actions, such as in Former Yugoslavia, will 
precede international criminal jurisdiction. The SC being the executive authority in the 
international system, as far as such an authority exists, is most likely to remain the 
origin for enforcement in cases with reluctant states.385 
Through acts like the definition and codification of core crimes and the establishment 
of general principles, the Statute of the ICC will promote the rule of law in ICL. But 
solely through the Statutes an enhancement of the possibilites of enforcement-
measures cannot be detected. „Rather, the promotion of regular and effective 
compliance will depend on the concerted political will of the members of the 
Assembly of states parties and of the Security Council. Such a concerted will – ‚a 
culture of legality’ – cannot arise from the formal qualities of the Statute alone, but 
depends on a number of factors lying outside the Statute and in some instances 
outside international law itself.“386 
The principle of conditionality could prove suitable to achieve cooperation of unwilling 
states: it provides for financial aid and other means of support from the international 
community to be handed out only to states that cooperate. Nitsche suggests the 
inclusion of a package of measures designed to regulate the steps to be taken 
against a non-cooperative but contractually obligated state. It should dictate the 
adoption of measures  according to the UN Charter, with the highest level being the 
submittal of the situation to the SC. Accoring to Art. 87(6), the ICC is also entitled to 
request support from international organisations, hence also the UN itself, even if the 
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case had not been referred by the SC. This could include support through UN 
Peacekeeping-Missions for arrests, investigations and the taking of evidence on site. 
Nitsche believes that out of moral obligation the UN could not reject such a 
proposal.387 
It is admitted by many scholars that the problem of enforcement has been given too 
little thought or discussion. „The problem of enforcing the ICC’s orders on the ground 
draws the circle back to the Security Council.“388 The ICC is not in the position to 
employ the use of force to make a state cooperate, this authority is safeguarded 
within the competence of the SC. This argument is taken up by the USA in order to 
underline its call for a stronger position of the SC. Wedgwood calls upon the 
hesitation to weave in the SC into the executive architecture of the Court to make its 
decisions heard and executed. „All-or-nothing packages will predictably make it 
harder to gain ratification in countries that would like nothing better than to be the 
treaty regime’s strongest supporter.“389 This point is also stressed by other American 
critics, assuming an extraordinary role for the US in the international sphere which 
should serve as reason enough to exempt it from international laws applicable to any 
other state. Apparently, the international community didn’t go for this compromise, 
which would have been contrary to its fundamental purpose and the thought of 
providing a framework of rules that applies similarly to all states, which constitutes 
the sheer function of law. The ICC would definitely be much stronger had it been 
erected in an American fashion, but it would have been downgraded to a tool that, by 
no means, can be dedicated to bringing justice. 
3.2.4 The Crime of Aggression 
To come back to Berman’s concept of the three pillars of the ICC, the hidden pillar, 
according to Berman, constitutes the crime of aggression.390 Unlike the other crimes, 
the crime of aggression necessarily suggests the involvement of a state. While for 
the other crimes, state participation is possible and was a fact in Former Yugoslavia, 
Rwanda and cases that are currently in front of the ICC, the crime of aggression by 
definition involves active criminal behaviour of a state. The politicization of this issue 
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was thus sweeping.391 Considering the fact that an unequivocal definition is hard to 
settle on in this case, states’ fear of it becoming a political weapon was high.392  
In order to assign individual criminal responsibility to the crime of aggression, two 
factors have to be preexisting: „an illegal use of force, an illegal armed attack by one 
State against another“, and, „an individual who is in a position of control and 
leadership in the attacking State whose action or conduct was, at least in part, a 
cause for the attack in question to take place.“393 
A group called the Non-Aligned Movement supported, amongst other issues, the 
cause of the inclusion of the crime of aggression.394 The fact that no consensus could 
be reached on the definiton of the crime of aggression constitutes a major letdown 
amidst the praise the Court has raised.395 It was still included in the Statute due to 
„the widespread demand for some acknowledgement of the importance of this crime, 
despite the inability of delegations to develop a generally acceptable definiton and 
relationship with the Security Council.“396 Due to the fact that amendments to the 
Statute may only be made seven years after 60 nations have ratified it, thus after it 
entered into force, progress on the problem of aggression may take some time.397 
Art. 5, regulating the crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC, states that „the Court 
shall exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression once a provision is adopted in 
accordance with articles 121 and 123 defining the crime and setting out the 
conditions under which the Court shall exercise jurisdiction with respect to this crime. 
Such a provision shall be consistent with the relevant provisions of the Charter of the 
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United Nations.“398 The problem of the difficult definiton of the crime of aggression 
might have been solvable had there been more time in Rome.399 
3.3 The USA and the ICC – an Outlook 
In the debate on the ICC, the absence of American support has been the focus of 
attention. Negotiations on the ICC have taken place with three US administrations, 
the most recent being the least promising. A heated debate in the international 
community arouse and drove a wedge between the EU and the US that is over to the 
present administration to fix. The lacking will of the worlds current only superpower 
and the country linked most as advocate of western values moots a series of 
problems. The new administration under President Barack Obama has been 
expected with high hopes for a new direction in international cooperation and a 
significant improvement of US-EU relations. Up until May 2009, however, Obama has 
been even more cautious in directions of the ICC and US contribution to it after 
making more direct and semi-assuring statements during the election process, where 
he commented on the ICCs actions in Darfur by saying: „These actions are a credit to 
the cause of justice and deserve full American support and cooperation.“400 Adding 
that „the United States should cooperate with the ICC investigation in a way that 
reflects American sovereignty and promotes our national security interests.“401 In 
what way he intends to realize this kind of cooperation is yet unknown. His former 
advisor Samantha Power commented on the issue by saying that until after the 
closure of Guantanamo, the end of the war in Iraq, and the renouncement of torture, 
an American membership in the ICC would be counterproductive for the Court’s 
credibility. According to Power, it would consolidate the Court’s reputation as an 
instrument for America’s hegemony and further burden the new president’s 
relationship to the US military. In any scenario, Obama indicated he would thoroughly 
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discuss any decision on ICC ratification with the US military.402 Vice-president Joe 
Biden is strongly in favour of US membership in the ICC.403 US support for the 
prosecution of Sudan’s president al-Bashir remains unaltered. In any case, in order 
for the USA to ratify the Statute of Rome it would have to pass debate in congress, 
which looks set to become difficult.404 Meanwhile, countries who refused to sign a 
BIA with the US have started to look for alternative powers to support them with 
military aid. „The American idea, grounded in legal principles, has been undermined“, 
and further, „Washington has broken ranks with the Western liberal tradition of which 
it should be a cornerstone.“405 The politics of double standards that the US is 
applying is obvious and very unlikely to survive for long. 
Mutual policies will be necessary and will yet increase in importance in most globally 
overlapping fields of politics and economics. A hegemonic power can be one 
guarantor for a system of mutual interests and benefits, but so can an international 
regime. In the words of Keohane, „by establishing legitimate standards of behaviour 
for states to follow and by providing ways to monitor compliance, they create the 
basis for decentralized enforcement founded on the principle of reciprocity.“406 
Keeping one’s flexibility regarding one’s position in the international community might 
be an outdated strategy, regarding the possible „substantial hidden costs“ that this 
model of choice could bear.407 Even in its position as superpower, the experience of 
the past years have shown that American ressources have been overstrained by two 
simultaneous wars. The solo run bore the advantage of independence, but a 
rethinking of foreign politics strategies has been announced and indicated. 
4  (Re-)Establishment of Peace through International 
Criminal Jurisdiction 
As laid out in chapters 2 and 3 the international criminal court is above all of 
immensely symbolic value and will require time to prove itself an acknowledged and 
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functioning institution. Not intending to undermine the success its mere establishment 
means to the international community, the following chapter is dedicated to evaluing 
the de facto effects arising from it in terms of the establishment of peace. Due to the 
moral implications in the concept of international criminal justice, it is difficult to 
assess it in a manner in which other  international institutions can be assessed 
regarding to their success. Hence, the goals stated by the SC and expressed in the 
preamble of the Statute of Rome shall serve as guidelines: „deterrence, justice and 
peace – halting future and redressing past violations of international humanitarian 
law and breaking the circle of ethnic violence and retribution (...).“408 
In the context of a grave breach of human rights that raises the attention of the 
international community, peace has been razed. Hence, to conclude logically, any 
attempt to reinstall peace in this situation needs to rectify this wrong that lies in the 
past. Criminal law is as such oriented towards the past: at the earliest while crimes 
are being committed, it can engage in its activity to settle the conflict. As such, it only 
deals with the violation of laws. The only matter in question is legally deviant 
behaviour, which it tries to clear out. In other words, it strives to neutralize the past 
events and hopes to thereby affect the present and future.  
When demasking the structure of a situation that involves grave breaches of human 
rights, a structure of vertically adjacent layers is exposed. Of these layers, the 
bottommost contains the source of conflict. In order to attain this causal sub-conflict, 
the overlying conflict-schemes have to be dismantled. These overlying, visible 
conflicts constitute the subject-matter of international criminal jurisdiction. By 
dissolving the effects, the cause is disclosed and accessible for joint conflict 
resolution. The split that the large-scale has generated can be resolved by the 
international organ, the problems rooted underneath it will persist. Solving the 
obvious conflict is the fundamental condition for further endeavours and peace 
efforts. The causal conflict is not accessible to international jurisdiction, its resolving 
does not constitute its assignment, since the complex and deep-rooted reasons 
demand political solutions. Kant refers to certain actions during warfare that can 
block the later establishment of peace. Speaking in the words of Kant, thus, an 
international criminal court has the task of neutralizing and, strictly technically 
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speaking, undoing these crimes, in order to ensure that they don’t endanger peace in 
the future.409  
International jurisdiction undertakes the groundwork to then leave the resolution of 
the underlying conflict to the community itself. What international criminal law is not 
capable of doing is to draw up guidelines for future handling of the common base the 
opposing parties share. Hence, criminal jurisdiction contributes to the establishment 
of negative structural peace. It cannot create positive peace, but lays the groundwork 
for its possible future formation. This common misconception has lead to 
disappointment among spectators of the ICTY and ICTR. The main merit of 
international criminal jurisdiction does not lie in the prevention of large-scale crimes 
in the first place, but in the re-establishment of peace following these crimes. In other 
words, it constitutes a means to an end.410 Even optimistic scholars admit that the 
expectation for international criminal jurisdiction to deter future large-scale crimes 
from happening is utopian, since its realistic possibilities are utterly limited. However, 
in order to justify prosecution, it is nevertheless substantiated as having certain 
merits: deterrence is one of them. The extent to which deterrence is a hoped-for by-
effect serving also as legitimization for the procedure as a whole will be discussed in 
chapter 5.1.1.1. 
4.1 Mechanisms of Action Arising from Peacemaking and 
Peacebuilding Processes 
As previously discussed in Chapter 2.2, peace is a broad term. Its effects embrace 
various aspects in a community, therefore to measure its impact is a task exceeding 
the possibilities given within the scope addressed in this thesis. On a theoretical 
basis, to which this thesis will mainly stick, there are four categories to measure the 
mechanisms of action arising from peacebuilding efforts through international 
jurisdiction. Individualization replaces collectivization, both regarding the perpetrators 
as well as the victims. This is closely linked with the rehabilitation of the victims, that 
provides accounting for the past as a means to prevent the events from producing 
collectivized myths on both sides. Breaking the cycle of vengeance and retaliation 
constitutes the third mechanism along with the positive influence to create a culture 
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of conflict solving.411 The fourth means in which international criminal justice can 
effect the peace process is by standardizing ways of conflict solving.412 
Due to the relatively young age of the ICC, it doesn’t seem sensible to try and predict 
what it might or will be able to do. Therefore, the practice used most often in the 
literature will be followed by drawing from the ad hoc tribunals as most recent 
embodiments of international criminal law in order to make assumptions on the 
effects the ICC can produce.413 Even more so because „a sustainable ICC cannot 
avoid learning from history.“414 Experience drawn from the ICTs has revealed the 
same questions that have been put forward regarding the ICC. 
4.1.1 Individualization of Delinquency 
Large-scale crimes often occur in the context of ethnic, political, religious or racial 
motivation. Both sides are seen as collective entities in which the individual loses its 
status and its significance. Against the backdrop of hatred focused on collectives, the 
feelings of pain, suffering and repayment too are being embraced by the collective 
entity, while projecting guilt onto the other collective. The opposed group is seen to 
be the embodiment of evil, especially in large-scale crimes that produced horrible 
atrocities. Moreover, the often unclear and confusing circumstances and a 
tremendously high number of victims render the situation not even remotely 
comprehensible. As a result, the perception shifts entirely away from individuals: the 
individual person becomes anonymous and recedes on behalf of the group. A 
collective consciousness is stressed or even only then first developed and both 
groups strongly delimitate themselves from one another up to complete isolation.415 
Reconciliation under such circumstances is very difficult. If it is not accomplishled, 
the cycle of retribution is very likely to continue. To prevent this, guilt has to be 
individualized. By prosecuting the major war criminals as well as naming the victims, 
the collectivization is inhibited. The notion of the alleged culprit people is replaced by 
the designation of the perpetrators. Individuals are blamed and the guilt of the 
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collective is lifted. And yet through individualization the suffering of another group can 
be acknowledged, as well as culpability of the own collective accepted.416 This is 
specifically important for the members of the collective that has been blamed: The 
truth can lift the weight of these charges off their shoulders.417 Individualizing the 
culpable individuals prevents the emergence of an attitude of ‚now more than ever’ 
among the foremost guilty collective. 
Again, the principle of a layered conflict scheme can be applied: By solving the 
crimes that constitute the sub-conflicts, the basic conflict is made accessible. The 
persisting of these crimes would hamper the solution of the root of the pivotal 
problem. In the end, what has to be solved is the underlying problem that causes 
conflicts to erupt. Through international criminal jurisdiciton, this first step can be 
achieved. 
Nitsche names a striking example for a failure in creating this shift on the Balkans. 
Resentments among Croats and Serbs had persisted since before World War II. 
When they erupted again during the Yugoslav War, body counts were used to 
legitimate the killings: Members of the Croatian Usta!a had killed 700.000 Serbs in 
World War II, whereas the Tschetniks had ‚only’ left 200.000 Croats dead. Hence, the 
Serbs asserted the claim to legitimately kill the remaining difference of 500.000 
during the Yugoslav War in 1991.418 
4.1.1.1 Deterrence 
The effects aspired through criminal law in the domestic sphere and on the 
international level are quite the same: the protection of society of deviant criminal 
behaviour, deterrence of possible further criminal behaviour, reinforcement of laws 
and the acknowledgement of the victims.419 Punishment through law is thus 
legitimated in a three-fold way: Since the right to live and to preserve one’s physical 
integrity constitutes a plain human right, its breach has to be punished. This breach 
has to be followed with a disadvantage for the perpetrator which needs to outweigh 
the advantage he created for himself by committing the crime. This way it can be 
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assured that the criminal behaviour wasn’t worthwhile. These two arguments are 
based on prevention. In order to ensure that the individual doesn’t become a purpose 
for the collective, the third argument constitutes retaliation.420 Others categorize the 
intentions of criminal prosecution into deterrence, retribution, incapacitation, and 
rehabilitation.421  The primary purpose according to Triffterer is to prevent crimes 
from happening, in the second instance the goal is also to punish and repress.422 
During the trials that took place at the ICTY, a heated debate arouse around the plea 
made by Drazen Erdemovic423, accused of committing mass murder in Srebrenica. 
He plead guilty acting out of necessity, claiming he himself would have been killed if 
he had refused to obey the command.424 One of the major goals of international 
criminal jurisdiction is to fulfill a pre-emptive impression. By trying the culprits of 
grave breaches, potential perpetrators are to be deterred. If the accused is acquitted 
or not tried at all, this signal is not being sent. Especially in the context of crimes 
against humanity, the pressure on the individual to stick to certain norms is very 
small, which explains the atrocities that are committed. International criminal law 
does not deal with typical criminal careers – rather real careers in criminal 
systems.425 In highly conflictive regions, public order is no longer intact, in most 
cases not in the least. It can be argued that the committed crimes are such that „were 
committed collectively by a larger group of persons as a part of social conflicts and 
processes in society.“426 This ‚differentiation between Micro- and Macro-Criminality’, 
as Triffterer puts it, is essential for the dilemma that arisses: By accepting the plea 
guilty out of necessity and acquitting the defendant, the chain of responsibility would 
break loose, impunity would be transfered down the chain of command leaving 
literally only the heads of the operation. If convicting a single soldier, other problems 
arise. How far do the options of a single individual reach in altering the events of a 
war? Only so much can be expected from the individual. By convicting a small 
number of rather simple soldiers, international criminal jurisdiction puts severe 
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demands on the individual, leaving aside their actual options. This would mean 
making heroic demands on simple individuals in order to establish an unfulfillable 
norm. It is to be doubted whether trust in human rights standards can be created 
effectively by doing so.427 
The individualization of guilt implicates the individualization of responsibility. As 
important as it is to avenge crimes, it still leaves a bitter aftertaste to perceive the 
source for the systematic deviant behaviour that led to them as the sum of 
misconduct of individuals, even more so if the affected individuals are plain recipients 
of orders.428 Large-scale crimes involve by definition a high number of actors in a 
complex system of intertwining causes and effects, producing collectively committed 
crimes out of political motivation. The sheer possibility of their happening can be 
derived from this exceptional situation inclined to criminality. The dynamics 
generated produce an environment in which the criminal behaviour constitutes the 
normal behaviour.429 Even by convicting the individuals, the injustice is neither 
undone, nor can it be adequately atoned. There is a real possibility of producing even 
more unjustice while trying to bring justice. While not only failing to promote the 
peace process, such a conviction can entirely disrupt it. For the greater good of 
deterrence, the individual is instrumentalized or even exploited, considering that 
severe penalties are enacted.430 If the general prevention of similar crimes is aspired 
by these means, it should be ensured that these measures are the key to success 
and that a benefit for society as a whole is achieved. The individualization of guilt that 
is being performed in scenarios of this kind is only justified, if a deterring effect can 
be expected. Otherwise it would arbitrarily infringe on the rights of the individual, 
sans the attainment of a greater goal.431  
The criterion of deterrence seems sensible regarding to its stabilizing effect on the 
trust in international norms. It is furthermore consistent with the peace-keeping duty 
that international criminal jurisdiction has. Although trust in international norms alone 
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will not bring about peace, it nevertheless creates a positive groundwork for it.432 
Notwithstanding, it seems hard to imagine how a sentence imposed on a single 
perpetrator is supposed to be a deterrant, especially since the trials mostly take place 
years after the crimes were committed. At the utmost, this can be expected to be 
successful if further fighting is feared.433  
Regarding deterrence on the international level, critics further hold against that 
international criminal jurisdiction is so selective that a deterring effect is impossible to 
be produced. Prosecution for all large-scale crimes will not be possible, not even for 
a permanent court. The Court’s approach will be selective and future criminals will 
gamble with this selectivity.434  And further, even in the national arena, deterrence 
can hardly be proven435 and is considered to be utterly limited in its possibilities.436  
Any deterring effect, naturally, has to be preceded by a halt of the human rights 
violations, which is mostly accomplished through military or political interference. 
Putting an end to ongoing crimes cannot, for lack of executive power, be the task of a 
judiciary organ, but its mere existence can definitely contribute to a fast termination. 
Without a de facto stop of criminal events, achieving deterrence is illusionary. In fact, 
the imperative condition of ending the ongoing violence first – before attempting to 
deter future acts of violence – poses a much bigger challenge.437 In Darfur, the 
rationale of the Court’s possibility to deter violence against civilians was used by the 
SC who referred the situation to the ICC. Such an effect can, however, not be 
detected.438 Solely through its mere existence a tribunal can obviously not deter 
criminal activity. 
In former Yugoslavia, the Kosovo Liberation Army as well as the forced displacement 
of Kosovo-Albanians by Serbian military took place deliberately, knowing of the 
regulations and processes of the ICTY. Even the NATO executed its attacks without 
consideration to international criminal regulations.439 The ICTs were appointed with 
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less than what they would have required in order to fulfill their purpose properly and 
satisfactory, both in respect of material resources as well as executive endorsement 
and support. This has to be borne in mind when judging their accomplishments that 
stay significantly below the possible optimum regarding redress and deterrence.440 
However, this ostensibly negative outlook for the deterring effect of prosecution on 
the international level doesn’t downgrade the Court’s effectivity as a whole, nor its 
possible future deterring capacity. Rather, this signifies that efforts to bolster its 
possibilities must be further intensified. Essentially, the deterring effect depends on 
the consistent pursuance of the principle of accountability. Both strands in 
collaboration can cause an abatement of the occurence of large-scale crimes that 
would deliver the affirmation of the deterring effect of international criminal 
prosecution.441 It is found among the writings of many scholars that a high possibility 
of criminal prosecution will have a stronger deterring effect than the prosecution of 
few crimes with very harsh sentences instead.442 „Relative certainty trumps relative 
severity“443, or „deterrence is directly proportional to accountability.“444 The ICC will 
require time in order to live up to this goal. 
The task assigned to international criminal law and national or domestic criminal law 
is essentially the same regarding their deterring function: It is assumed and disputed, 
but in both cases that doesn’t lead to the redundancy of criminal law.445 The 
discussion of deterrence can too be put into the pattern applicable to the fundamental 
debate around international criminal prosecution: the chasm between redress and 
deterrence. Redress stresses the position of the victims and the necessity for 
accountability to prevail. This is viewed by critics as endangering the peace process 
by focusing on past events rather than placing value on a peaceful settlement and 
coexistence in the future. Again, this view is controversial since it bears the possibility 
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of sacrificing the victim’s rights and the principle of accountability to the potential 
greater good of deterrence. „This distinction would not be problematic if the 
preference for one purpose was not viewed as denigrating or eliminating fulfillment of 
the other.“446  
4.1.2 Rehabilitation of the Victims 
On the level of the individual, the factors mentioned in chapter 1.1.15. lead to 
processing and overcoming of the experienced. The acknowledgement of anguish 
and woe confirms the fact that the crimes have been committed. Through this 
originates a forum for the victims in which their experiences are asserted on a social 
level before a general public paying attention. Acknowledging of the experiences of 
victims leads to the disposition to forgiveness. Rehabilitation of the individual can 
also have an effect on the collective – comparable to group therapy for the victims in 
their entirety. Their collective dignity is restored and equality recovered, humiliation is 
neutralized. The objectivization of the occurrences prevents the formation of myths 
and distinctive writing of history. Due to the large amount of victims after large-scale 
crimes this is possibly the biggest challenge to the court.  
International Law as such is state-oriented. The period of the Westphalian peace in 
1648 until the end of World War II has been dominated by this view. Only gradually 
has the individual become an acknowledged subject within it, partly springing from 
the development of international law after World War II: prosecution of individuals – 
thus accountability of individuals -  suggests the need to protect individuals – hence 
their position is validated. Rehabiliation and reparation are mutually dependant: 
Achieving the granting of the victim’s position, including its right to redress, is an 
inherent part of this appreciation of the individual.447  
This approach raises certain difficulties in the context of accountability: crimes are 
committed by individuals, whether in a position of a state official or not, its not 
possible or at least not sensible to hold the state as an entity liable. By doing this, the 
                                            
446 Gallón, "The International Criminal Court and the Challenge of Deterrence." p. 94. 
447 Bassiouni, Introduction to International Criminal Law. p. 90-92. Bassiouni mentions the discrepancy 
between international human rights law and international criminal law: „It seems as if the former is a 
shield without a sword, and the latter a sword without a shield. The parallelism of these two bodies of 
law limits the reach of international criminal law to punish fundamental human rights violations, while 
these rights remain without effective enforcement.“ Bassiouni, Introduction to International Criminal 
Law. p. 92. 
 86 
entire population would be criminalized, a result that - even in macro-crime scenarios 
– doesn’t reflect the reality. For this reason, the view that prevailed provides that 
liability is not attributed to the state; it is, however, given the responsibility to make 
reparations for crimes committed, more or less, in its name.448 In the Statute of the 
ICC, the state is not addressed for the reparation of victims.449 
The Statute provides for the Court to „make an order directly against a convicted 
person specifying appropriate reparations to, or in respect of, victims, including 
restitution, compensation and rehabilitation. Where appropriate, the Court may order 
that the award for reparations be made through the Trust Fund provided for in article 
79.“450 McKay points out that „this was the first real attempt to develop a reparation 
regime in the context of international criminal justice and thus its content had to be 
built largely from first principles.“451 Fear for the newly inaugurated court to be 
showered with claims from victims, as well as concern it would turn into a ‚social 
service agency’ dominated the debate on how to properly regulate reparation within 
the Statute.452 Clearly, this represents an ethical debate: the focus doesn’t lie on the 
realization as much as on the search for a normatively adequate solution first. 
The question of victim compensation is essentially a difficult one. Who is supposed to 
bear the costs? „Can a Tutsi government with no resources be expected to provide 
compensation to Tutsi citizens for violations committed by a Hutu regime?“453 Past 
experiences have shown that monetary reparations aren’t essential for reconciliation 
– bringing out the truth, and hearing an apology, has been enough in a number of 
cases.454 Naturally, this is also due to the fact that the ad hoc tribunals only 
marginally handled the question of reparation, and even in the process leading up to 
the establishment of the ICC several drafts didn’t mention it.455 However, the outlook 
of reparation not being absolutely necessary for a peace process is fortunate for the 
ICC, since satisfactory compensation for the losses of victims in a macro-crime 
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scenario seems entirely unthinkable.  On the other hand, however, the ICC strives for 
the deference of human rights of which victim’s rights form an integral part. 
Considering the fact that the ICC aims to protect human rights it should impose its 
standards on the guidelines of the Court’s jurisdiction.456 Bassiouni lists the 
unwillingness to recognize the victim’s right to justice and to redress as another sign 
of the „schism that exists between humanitarian and humanistic values on the one 
hand and political realism on the other.“457 Essentially, validation of victim’s rights 
constitutes a fundamental part of the goals ICL is aiming for, such as accountability, 
the rule of law, and justice: While still being far from perfect or even operative, there 
has still been progress on the idea of victim-orientation in ICL.458  
The efficiency of this reparation regime amounts to a different question and is 
disputable regarding the fact that the ICC’s jurisdiction is based on the pre-condition 
of unwillingness or unability of the national state to prosecute. Hence – it may be 
expected that this state is not able or willing to enforce repayments either.459 On the 
bright side, the ICC enjoys relative flexibility regarding reparations of victims: 
provided that it is granted support in order to enforce its measures, the reparation 
regime is certainly a positive factor in the framework of the ICC. 
4.1.2.1 Amnesties 
The question of amnesties was intensively debated at the conference in Rome. They 
constitute a political tool that has often proved necessary in order to achieve a 
criminal regime to step down and allow a transition process to begin. But it moots a 
series of important questions related to justice. „If punishment is the international 
community’s right by virtue of the implied social contract, does it also include the right 
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to pardon?“460 The right to punish used to be that of the victim, essentially. If the 
international community now takes over this right, the right to pardon should remain 
with the victim and at least not be bartered with. Bassiouni takes this argumentation 
to another level, saying that victim’s rights are a fundamental part of the social 
contract which in turn is vested in legal history. Thus, for the representatives of state 
to abnegate these victim’s rights would be an act of ultra vires, an action exceeding 
its power. Quite the other opposite is what a state is obliged to induce: to see that the 
victim’s rights are assumed, whatever these rights may constitute. The exact 
procedure of this process is not fixed.461 „(Consequently), neither de jure nor de facto 
impunity can be provided to the transgressors of these ius cogens international 
crimes.“462 According to the social contract theory victim’s rights are both „inherent 
and inalienable.“463 Granting impunity would thus be a violation of human rights. It 
would further possibly violate humanitarian law, since the Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 1948 as well as the Geneva 
Conventions explicitally contain the duty to punish grave breaches of human 
rights.464 The Geneva Conventions also provide for the prosecution of officials and 
the definition of genocide within it is the same as in the Statute of the ICC. Hence, 
according to treaty law, the granting of amnesties where prosecution would be 
required is not allowed. However, since the existing framework of law provides the 
obligation of states to prosecute, it is strictly legally speaking not clear whether the 
ICC has the same obligation.465 Whether international law definitely and strictly 
interdicts the awarding of amnesties cannot assuredly be said.466  
In truth, victim’s rights have been traded with political arrangements on any number 
of occasions. These trades are often necessary or reasoned to be necessary in order 
to achieve a pacification in the prevailing conflict. Granting impunity has been 
standard procedure in the international community, whether it be Kaiser Wilhelm or 
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Milosevic who were granted participation in horse trades that let the victim’s rights fall 
by the wayside.467 Amnesties have often been used by leaders as a condition for 
their resigning and paving the way for democratic transition. Further, newly imposed 
governments often don’t possess the institutional power it takes to initiate criminal 
proceedings after periods of grave social unrest. Rwanda, for instance, didn’t dispose 
of the jurisdictional infrastructure necessary in order to perform trials.468 Impunity can 
thus be granted or just occur by inability or unwillingness of a state to prosecute the 
crime.469 Amnesties are, however, not exactly the same as impunity: While amnesty 
qualifies as a „deliberate positive action“, impunity constitutes „an act of exemption 
(...) from punishment, or from injury or loss.“470 It can only occur after someone has 
been pronounced guilty – to grant it before a trial even is a pure embodiment of 
impunity. „Accountability is the antithesis of impunity.“471 In cases where amnesties 
are applied, justice is definitely traded to a certain extent with the hope for a greater 
good.472 
Ruth Wedgwood in ‚An American View’ on the Court comments that she sees it as a 
good sign that the jurisdiction of the Court will focus on war crimes committed as part 
of a bigger plan, suggesting systematic policy, and not involve „the defalcations that 
are often committed in war.“473 She further points out the costs of prosecution, 
emphasizing that in most of the fundamental regime changes in the recent past such 
as in the former communist European states, it was a question of either/or. Truth 
Commissions might be an option in such a situation, but a real transition is very likely 
to be made at the price of amnesties.474 In the process leading up to the ICC, the 
USA put forward the suggestion that it should include the possibility of amnesties. 
Resistance to this proposal was big, explaining why it was not explicitly included in 
the Statute.475 
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The question of amnesties was very controversially debated, emphasizing especially 
the importance of a smooth transition to democratic governance and the role of 
reconciliation commissions.476 In the end it was decided not to mention amnesties in 
the Statute, although Art. 53(1)C suggests nothing else when mentioning that the 
Prosecutor shall determine whether a prosecution will be in the best interest of 
justice.477 Further, Art. 17(2)(a) explicitly lists an investigation led by the attempt to 
shield a person from criminal prosecution as an indication of an unwilling national 
government, marking the point where the complementary jurisdiction of the ICC sets 
in.478 Explicitly including amnesties in the Statute would have pulled the rug out from 
under the Statute in its aim to announce impunity a phenomen of the past.479 In the 
Statutes of the ICC itself the determination to „put an end to impunity for the 
perpetrators of these crimes and thus to contribute to the prevention of such 
crimes“480 is pointed out. It would thus „have run counter to the basic objectives of 
the United Nations if respect for amnesties granted by individual states had become 
an obligation of the ICC.“481 The UN have always stressed the fact that amnesties 
are inacceptable when it comes to crimes such as genocide and crimes against 
humanity.482  
So amnesties could be one way to grant impunity and thus reduce international 
criminal justice to absurdity. „The choice is between the application of blanket 
amnesties and politically motivated pardons without the democratically given consent 
of the victims and meeting some of the victims’ rights while achieving a greater social 
benefit.“ 483 In other words, the effect of impunity resulting from amnesties is „merely 
a by-product of a decision taken for the purpose of national reconciliation.“484 
Amnesties given in situations where criminal guilt is on hand cannot be in the interest 
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of peace because it destroys belief in the fairness and steadfastness of law and thus 
of justice altogether.485 As such, it can also not be expected to produce a deterring 
effect on possible criminals.486 Regarding the positive effect criminal prosecution is 
intended to have on the peace process, amnesties can run counter to it by imposing 
the decision of granting amnesties to criminal leaders without the consent of the 
population.487  
Essentially, there are two sides to the medal of accountability. One is the 
responsibility of the state to act in the interests of justice and peace, and, essentially, 
maybe having to trade one for the other. In this context, it might also not always be 
„in the interest of the international community to force a fledgling democracy to 
commit political suicide.“488 The other side represents the individual accountability of 
officials, which, slowly but constantly, is taken out of the hands of the state. It is 
therefore no longer dependent on the concerned state; whether this state may be in 
the position to assist the prosecution is ultimately irrelevant.489 
This dilemma is perfectly illustrated in the ongoing debate about the arrest warrant 
issued for Sudan’s president al-Bashir. Held against this measure by many is the 
concern that this constitutes yet another contribution to the already majorly instable 
situation in Sudan. With yet hundreds of thousands of people in refugee camps and 
heated diplomatic attempts from all sides and, above all, the UN; angering al-Bashir 
is perceived as an unwise step that could throw not just the peace process back by 
years, but produce immediate negative effects for the masses of victims. These 
concerns were not without cause: al-Bashir immediately ordered several NGOs and 
aid workers to leave – a fatal decision for the millions of people in Sudan that fully 
depend on them. Further, the UN peacekeeping troops are made likely targets for 
acts of retaliation by the Sudanese government. Already, several peacekeepers have 
been killed in Sudan. Moreno-Ocampo’s move is specifically questionable when 
considering the fact that the ICC is highly unlikely to catch al-Bashir, who enjoys 
broad support among the government officials of many countries. What the 
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prosecutor effectively establishes by still pressing charges against him is a clear sign 
in direction of the international community that people of all ranks within a state will 
be held liable for criminal activity on a large scale.490 „The strategic studies literature 
indicates that coercion is likely to be successful if threats are accompanied by 
reassurances and if the coercer’s demands do not impinge on the vital security or 
survival interests of the regime.“491 This would mean that „who can be prosecuted will 
depend on whose cooperation is needed for a political settlement.“492 Scholars 
assess the prosecution of high-ranked leaders as the biggest impact the tribunals in 
Rwanda and Yugoslavia have had. It was then that the population assigned 
credibility and a genuin aspiration for justice to the tribunal. Coliver explicitly points 
out explicitly that the issuing of an arrest warrant should not be bound to the 
existence or lack of political will backing it up, since precisely the political will is 
subject to considerations that change over time and thus, it might develop.493 In the 
case of Former Yugoslavia, many believed that pressing charges against Milo!evic 
would endanger the safe return of Kosovars, similar to the fear that indicting Mladic 
and Karadzic would render the Dayton peace accord impossible. Both was not the 
case; rather continuing to negotiate with them would have posed a threat to the 
peace process.494  
The question of whether or not amnesties should be granted certainly cannot be 
answered properly on the basis of these considerations. It adds up to deciding 
individually as necessity arises. The current management of the question of 
amnesties can be recapitulated as follows: states are constrained to do all in their 
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power to rectify past breaches of human rights, but ultimately the power of decision is 
taken to the international level to restrain possible arbitrariness.495  
4.1.2.2 The Role of the Prosecutor 
Another problem woven into the architecture of the ICC is the multiplicity of 
overlapping interests that are supposed to be defended: The ICC will have to act on 
behalf of the interests of the victims of macro-crimes, the affected states, and the 
community of states involved. Since the interests of these groups will necessarily 
diverge, it will be left to the prosecutor to decide whose interest should prevail. Even 
in national courts, the victim’s interests may be quite different from those of society.  
Critics have argued that due to the many ultimately political decisions that are now 
left to the prosecutor to decide, a „representative and deliberative policy-making 
body“ should be installed within the framework of the ICC.496 The prosecuting body 
will be crucial to the outcome the ICC will produce.497 With respect to the principle of 
legality, the prosecution could be taken out of the political context: with organs 
compulsory having to investigate, the political implications this might have are not 
being considered.498 This would put justice on the upper hand. On the other hand, 
that might not always be the best idea, considering that jeopardizing a peace-process 
is a true option here. Both interests need to be balanced.499 
4.1.3  Disruption of the Cycle of Retaliation (& Promotion of Conflict Culture) 
As mentioned in chapter 1.1.15, by prosecuting grave breaches in macro-crime 
scenarios the necessary end is put to a conflict. In Rwanda as well as in Former 
Yugoslavia old scores were settled. The perception of having been victimized urges  
retaliation. If no end is put to the conflict, it erupts in cycles, since a balance in deaths 
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and oppression that is also perceived as such will hardly ever be achieved. In order 
to leave behind the impression of having conducted fair and unbiased trials, the 
international court in charge has to be able to conduct its work independently of 
strategic political considerations. However, as broadly laid out in the previous 
chapters, this de facto independence is not granted. Be it regarding the selection of 
crimes that will even be considered for international criminal jurisdiction or the 
possibilities of the court to work freely and independently of state cooperation, it has 
been laid out clearly that the ICC will too, in the tradition of its predecessors, work 
within a very limited scope of actual possibilites. Not surprisingly, this severely affects 
the standing the institution has in the local setting that it is designed to bring justice 
to.  
In Former Yugoslavia, major war criminals remained in office. They were even the 
negotiating parties and contact persons of the international community.500 When 
investigations were running against Franjo Tudjman of Croatia, Slobodan Milo!evic of 
Serbia and Montenegro and Alija Izbetgovic of Bosnia-Hercegovina, all of them were 
the highest representatives of their states.501 The same is true for Foday Sankoh, 
leader of the RUF in Sierra Leone.502 In the case of Former Yugoslavia, the 
international community signalized unwillingness to support charges against them 
and consequently no criminal prosecution was taken up.503 The reasons therefore lay 
partly in fear of destabilization of the region in case of a resurgence of the conflict. 
Especially short-term interests followed by the NATO member-states played an 
important role. It wasn’t until the conflict in Kosovo escalated into war that the lawsuit 
against Milo!evic could be taken up, notabene after the NATO campaign against the 
FRY had been going on for 60 days. The international community held on to 
protecting Milo!evic until he conducted his criminal actions in such a bold and 
unapologetic manner that whitewashing him was no longer possible. Only then was 
the ICTY finally able to receive documents from the secret service of both the USA 
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and Great Britain that it had been trying to obtain for a long time.504 The major 
powers were thus not only not supportive but essentially hampering the work of the 
tribunal. This kind of abuse of the tribunal for political considerations left it 
delegitimized. Among the involved conflict parties the tribunal was perceived as an 
instrument of victor’s justice used to control the Balkan States. As such, it can hardly 
act out its peace-establishing mission. On the contrary, it led to the emergence of 
martyrdom, revanchism and the maintenance of tensions among the region as a 
result of the „regrettable tendency of criminal justice to occasionally take on the 
appearance of retribution and revenge.“505 Former judges of the ICTY Richard 
Goldstone and Carla del Ponte stressed the fact that political will was scarce, and the 
attempts to obtain assurance by state officials endless.506 
Further, it can even be said that the attempt to trade peace for justice by granting 
impunity to criminal leaders has failed in both Former Yugoslavia and Sierra Leone. 
Instead of their peaceful settling for a high price, conflicts in both countries rekindled. 
Milo!evic even moved on to committing further large-scale atrocities in Kosovo.507 On 
other government officials, the threat of being indicted had a moderating effect on 
their political orientation, forcing them to keep a low profile.508 Especially from the 
Serbian community the tribunal was perceived as victor’s justice, but essentially this 
reproach was made by the Croat side too. Alija Izbetgovic, who remained in office, 
was considered a war criminal by many; his sparing was met with lack of 
understanding, especially since the war leaders of the other parties, Karadzic and 
Mladic, were indicted. The Bosniak party to the conflict, on the other hand, doubts 
that these leaders will ever be captured. Further, the fact that only few of the 
masterminds behind the genocide and war crimes were captured fueled 
dissatisfaction with the tribunal among all parties involved. The deaths of Slavko 
Dokmanovic, who committed suicide, and Milan Kovacevic, who suffered a fatal heart 
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attack, and even Slobodan Milosevic too were regarded as resulting from poor prison 
conditions among the Serbian community, while the Bosniaks perceived it as injust 
that these major war criminals hadn’t lived to see justice be brought to them.509 
The lack of independent media further impeded the possibilities of the tribunal in the 
beginning, while the nationalist media used this advantage to exploit its monopoly. 
Ignorance as to the functioning of the tribunal, the number of indicted and their 
background contributed to the negative standing in the population.510 
Clearly, these examples illustrate the difficulties a tribunal faces in the ambition to 
establish justice. While some of the reasons that damaged the reputation of the ICTY 
can be linked directly to poor cooperation, they laid the foundation for criticism 
exploding in all directions. The experience of the ICTY perfectly demonstrates the 
difficult endeavour of handling a macro-crime situation to the satisfaction of all parties 
involved. The experience of the ad hoc tribunals also teaches the lesson that genuine 
progress in their work was only possible when political will of the major powers was 
given.511 The self-interested irregularity of the will to support and its subjectedness to 
other political considerations were what compromised the tribunals integrity. 
4.1.4 Standardization of Conflict Solving 
By administering criminal justice on the international level,  the ICC can promote the 
consistency of the appliance of law. Nitsche speaks of the charisma that will emanate 
from the court and subsequently affect national legal systems. He predicts that from 
this an equalization regarding the treatment of grave breaches is to be expected, 
leading to a universalization of standardized norms. Different legal orders will 
assimilate their regulations according to the Court’s practice, leading to a 
harmonization in the provisions worldwide.512 By way of example, the handling of the 
death penalty can account as such an aspect. The SC had excluded capital 
punishment as an option within the jurisdiction of the ad hoc tribunals. In Rome, the 
determination was more difficult, given that the jurisdiction of the ICC is intended to 
reflect all legal systems to a certain extent in order to be able to unite them under one 
roof. Considering the sweeping majority of states absolutely against it, the severest 
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penalty enactable is life imprisonment, and that too only „when justified by the 
extreme gravity of the crime and the individual circumstances of the convicted 
person.“513  By refusing to punish even the most heinous crimes with the death 
penalty, the ICC can act as a radiator, pressing ahead with the abolition of this 
sentence altogether. Also Broomhall refers to the effect on criminal provisions 
worldwide. He believes that a culture of accountability will develop through the 
course of international criminal jurisdiction. This anon can be used to regulate 
political pressure. The Statute of Rome can contribute to the strengthening of the rule 
of law by defining core crimes and standardizing general principles. Whether this will 
have a positive effect on enforcement is unclear.514 But most importantly, the concept 
of impunity is implemented.  The lack of criminal sanctions imposed against breaches 
of human rights on the international level will at least in some cases be opposed.515  
Already now, Spain, Belgium and Germany follow the principle of universal 
jurisdiction which implies to hold alleged perpetrators criminally liable even if the 
accused is not a citizen of the state and the crime has been committed in a different 
country. In 1998, Spanish judge Baltasar Garzón managed to have former Chilean 
leader Augusto Pinochet arrested in London.516 In Spanish national law, these 
regulations go back to 1985, some even to the 1870s.517 In the case of universal 
jurisdiction, „the connection to the prosecuting state is not made through any 
particular connection of the state to the criminal event, but rather to the nature of the 
crime itself.“518 Over one hundred countries incorporate some forms of universal 
jurisdiction over certain crimes in their legal orders.519 Spain further succeeded in 
practicing jurisdiction in the case covering thousands of people that have been killed 
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or gone missing in Guatemalas Civil War between 1978 and 1986.520 Other cases 
involved former officials of Congo, Chad, and Suriname. In the end, none of these 
indictments succeeded fully, neither did the Pinochet case, but they illustrate the 
potential of universal jurisdiction.521 In 1999, Belgium introduced universal jurisdiction 
that didn’t even require the presence of the indicted at trial. Officiating heads of state 
can also be indicted. Further, pressing charges is possible also for parties neither 
Belgian, nor resident in Belgium. The most prominent in this context is the case 
involving Ariel Sharon’s indictment by a group of Lebanese-Palestinians for crimes 
against humanity, war crimes and genocide during the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 
1982.522 In this case, it was ultimately decided that the defendant needed to be in 
Belgium in order to be indicted, and the proceedings were stopped. After George W. 
Bush, Dick Cheney, and other high-ranking US officials were indicted by Iraqis in 
Belgium for atrocities committed during the Gulf War in 1991, pressure on Belgium 
was tuned up. Ultimately, the law was modified in order to make it more difficult to 
draw on it in cases that don’t concern Belgium according to traditional national 
criminal law.523  
The standardization of conflict solving also implies the building of a memory for large-
scale crimes: Courts and tribunals fulfill the purpose of a record of history for 
generations to come. This is essential in order to guarantee that history is not 
forgotten and thus not repeated but preserved as a monument to the crimes and the 
victims they produced.524 By establishing a tribunal an archive is built: the crime is 
preserved, future generations will remember it.525 The threat of „historical amnesia“ is 
thus warded off, as former ICTY president Antonio Cassese puts it.526 
                                            
520 Menchu, "Spain May Judge Guatemala Abuses," BBC News (October 5, 2005), vol. 
521 Roht-Arriaza, The Pinochet Effect. Transnational Justice in the Age of Human Rights. p. 170. 
522 The particular charges were aimed at the committal of these crimes in refugee camps through 
Lebanese militias that the Israeli forces did not avert. Ibid. p. 189. 
523 Ibid. p. 190. 
524 Cassese, "From Nuremberg to Rome: International Military Tribunals to the International Criminal 
Court." p. 6. See also: Sewall, Kaysen and Scharf, "The United States and the International Criminal 
Court: An Overview." p. 2. 
525 Cassese, "From Nuremberg to Rome: International Military Tribunals to the International Criminal 
Court." p. 6.  
526 Antonio Cassese is quoted in: Coliver, "The Contribution of the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the Former Yugoslavia to Reconciliation in Bosnia and Herzegovina." p. 28. 
 99 
4.2 Truth Commissions – A Feasible Alternative? 
As laid out in the previous chapters, criminal prosecution as a tool for establishing 
peace is disputable. The possibility of alternative ways of accouting for committed 
crimes exists; its embodiment will depend on the nature of the breach and other 
factors inherent to the specific situation.527 The Rome Statute of the ICC doesn’t 
object to the establishment of truth commissions. Truth commissions and criminal 
prosecution are often seen as mutually exclusive, when in fact, their concerns differ 
greatly. Establishing the truth only marginally deals with the question whether anyone 
will be prosecuted for the crimes that come into the open during the work of the 
commission. Truth commissions as such don’t contradict possible criminal 
prosecution, instead, they can carve the way for criminal proceedings by introducing 
measures such as reparations for and restitutions to the victims.528 Further, they 
don’t have the same implications as amnesties. „If the goal of truth commissions is 
remembrance, the purpose of amnesties is oblivion.“529 The following four points can 
be made about truth commissions: 
“(1) they focus on past events; 
(2) they attempt to discern the overall picture of a conflict as opposed to a given 
event;  
(3) they exist for a finite period of time, generally ceasing with the publication of a 
report; and 
(4) they generally have some form of authority emanating from either an international 
or national mandate.”530 
Truth commissions have been adapted in Argentina, Bolivia, Chad, Chile, El 
Salvador, Ethiopia, South Africa, Uganda, Uruguay and Zimbabwe.531 They are 
generally said to have positively influenced the situation in which they were 
implemented. Truth commissions stress the position of the victims rather than 
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anything else and emanate a kind of ‚restorative justice’.532 For the victims, truth 
commissions are more likely to lead to overcoming of the past, since the perpetrators 
are more inclined to confess.533 The possible unfairness and polarization resulting 
from prosecutions is one aspect held against them and in favour of truth 
commissions. Other reasoning is of financial nature, suggesting that truth 
commissions are cheaper.534 While this is true, they can be abused for whitewashing, 
image-amelioration and distortion of the truth, as has happened in Uganda in 1974 
and in Chad in 1990.535 The prosecutor of the ICTY opposed to truth commissions in 
virtue of fear that they would constitute an easy alternative and deliver an excuse for 
non-cooperating governments that see their duty to address the past crimes as done 
by working with truth commissions.536 
Alternatives to prosecution should consequently only be an option if they themselves 
constitute a kind of punishment, in order to avoid the effect of impunity.537One 
approach is to say that criminal prosecution should be used to deal with the leaders 
of grave braches, whilst the crimes of less involved culprits could be met with 
conditional amnesties and / or truth commissions.538  
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5 Conclusion and Outlook 
5.1 Conclusion 
In order to assess the possible effects the ICC can have through its work, the 
predecessing tribunals have been analyzed. Compared to its predecessors, the ICC 
is weak. The ICTY, enjoying far better prerequisites, failed helplessly in many ways, 
which doesn’t leave much hope for the ICC and at the same time makes the fragility 
of these instruments painfully clear.539 However, in retrospective the ICTs have been 
judged quite successful in the achievement of their set goals, at least partly, after 
being considered to be paper tigers in the beginning. This justifies the expectation of 
a similar development for the ICC, especially since it will be a permanent institution. 
Realist political approach will still be in favour of ad hoc tribunals as opposed to a 
permanent court demanding the compliance of duties,540 since the ad hoc tribunals 
„best reconcile the goals of international criminal jurisdiction and the pursuit of 
political ends.“541 It is yet sheer impossible to genuinely assess the peacekeeping 
effects the ICTs have had on Rwanda and Yugoslavia, taking into account all the 
implications that have been discussed throughout this thesis. They have not been a 
panacea for the myriad of problems dominating a country after a brutal war, and only 
time will truly tell whether lasting peace has been established. As of now, the effects 
of international criminal law cannot entirely be proven. By and large, they seem 
sound to assume, but their coming into effect remains uncertain and not least 
debatable.542 
The mechanisms of action that arise from the prosecutions can contribute vitally to 
peace process, but the expectations directed at the Court’s work mustn’t exceed the 
doable. When evaluating the ICC’s future achievements, it will be crucial to bear in 
mind that a penal procedure before the ICC can certainly not replace other means of 
accounting for the past, it can only serve as a subsidiary pillar. A consummated 
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condemnatory sentence is not to be put on a level with successful reconcilement.543 
Reconciliation and prosecution need to be balanced in a way that doesn’t produce 
the impression that justice is up for negotiation.544 Further, much attention will be 
directed at the choice of lawsuits: an objective selection of cases will be pivotal in 
order to silence the voices that lay selectivity to the Court’s charge and weaken the 
impression of it being a tool of western imperialism. 
The possibility of the ICCs efforts to remain chanceless without political support is 
very likely.545 For an international tribunal to contribute to the peace process very 
much depends on the velocity with which it can work, which again is dependant on 
the support and cooperation of the international community, including support of 
financial kind. Without witnesses, evidence and testimonies, a court cannot achieve 
anything.546 Much of the ICC’s success will depend on the degree to which the states 
actually make use of it.547 „The international community (..) has a rather complicated 
legislative procedure, no executing power and its judiciary is only beginning to 
operate on a world wide scale.“548 It cannot be affirmed that the ICC enjoys genuine 
independence due to its linkage to the SC. Independent action is scarcely to be 
expected in cases that involve its influence. Past experiences have shown that an 
interplay of forces of coercive diplomacy and legal deterrence are most likely to 
achieve the goals of international justice and the necessary intermediate objectives 
such as halting on-going violence. Coercive diplomacy implies the use of force, but 
not with the goal of a military defeat. Rather it strikes to persuade and corner the 
affected state or military leaders to bow to the inevitable.549 
The indictment of Sudan’s President Omar al-Bashir serves as a textbook example to 
summarize the problems related to international criminal jurisdiction: the reproach 
towards the international community of unjust treatment resulting from the fact that 
the major powers, with the US leading the way, don’t accept the Court’s jurisdiction, 
as well as the fact that the ICC’s endeavours in Africa represent dictation and 
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paternalism of the West, that is anon facilitated by the regulations of complementarity 
in the Statute. The third-party jurisdiction executed by the Court which made the 
indictment of al-Bashir possible, since Sudan had not ratified the Treaty of Rome, is 
even more problematic given the US support for the charges pressed against the 
controversial president. In particular, the delicate issue of disturbing important 
transition processes by introducing criminal prosecution in a macro-crime scenario 
was clearly visible in its fragility when Sudan reacted to the accusations by expelling 
aid workers. This also shows the political impact of the decisions made by the 
Prosecutor and the strong role they play within the architecture of the Court. Further, 
the deterring effects that are aspired for through international criminal jurisdiction did 
not occur in this case. The probability of an arrest of al-Bashir remains very limited, 
so the ball is in the court of the international community and the SC once again. A 
concerted diplomatic strategy will be needed to realize the Court’s aspiration to 
prosecute al-Bashir without losing sight of the bigger goal of halting the ongoing 
violence. 
The attempt to establish impunity as a principle in international relations has 
witnessed many setbacks. However, since the period of the establishment of the ad 
hoc tribunals, the concept of impunity has been having up wind.550 „Historically, the 
battle for international criminal jurisdiction, which started after World War I, continues 
with the establishment of the ICC.“551 Whilst admittedly being very weak in many 
respects, it is still the strongest tool available for that specific goal. Through regular 
usage that will require time to set in, the ICC will build up a standing in international 
relations. Every assessment, especially when negative, consequently has to consider 
that the Court will need time to show its merits. 
5.2 Outlook 
It has been laid out how the ICC depends on several factors in order to achieve the 
goals it was designed for. Below the most important of these factors will be listed. 
Realist approach to international relations still dominates the strategical policy of 
many states. The resulting security dilemma predicts the persistance of asymmetry in 
the global community. Powerful states will thus have to be incorporated into the 
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architecture of any successful international tool for justice. But a turnaround in the 
attitude of the US is possible in order for it to stabilize its position. An ongoing refusal 
of the USA to join in efforts of international criminal jurisdiction would not necessarily 
mean the deathblow for the ICC. As seen in the conduct of chief prosecutor Moreno-
Ocampo and the sustained support of the remaining Western powers, the disposition 
to subordinate the Court to American tactics is not given.  
It has been pointed out how the position of the prosecutor will tip the scales in many 
of the issues addressed. His policy can turn out in favour of the ICC and could also 
harm it quite severely. It will be important to observe the future conduct of Moreno-
Ocampo to evaluate the picture of the Court he aspires: Given the relatively strong 
role of the prosecutor, his actions will determine much of the outcome of the 
questions discussed above. NGOs, media, legal communities and the states will form 
the audience to this and certainly radiate their influence on him to a certain extent.552  
Further, a public and political communication strategy will be crucial for the ICC. The 
affected population has to understand the crimes and following prosecutions, even 
more so considering the fact that the media in the concerned state will have an 
agenda of its own that might not be in favour of the ICC. The Court needs a „public 
outreach capacity and strategy.“553 Part of this strategy could be the goal to 
prosecute representative crimes, since it will not be possible to punish all those 
deserving of punishment. Through channeled and correct information it can also be 
prevented that hopes are built up that exceed the possibilities of what criminal 
prosecution can achieve. In combination with this, as already outlined in chapter 5.2, 
Truth Commissions can serve as an effort designed to contribute to the desired 
positive effects that prosecution is hoped to produce but cannot fully do so. 
                                            
552 Morris, "Complementarity and Its Discontents: States, Victims, and the International Criminal 
Court." p. 182. 
553 Coliver, "The Contribution of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia to 
Reconciliation in Bosnia and Herzegovina." p. 28-29. 
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Zusammenfassung 
Die Debatte um den ICC, seine Rechtmäßigkeit und Wirksamkeit im Rahmen des 
Schutzes der Menschheit vor groben Menschenrechtsverletzungen ist sehr komplex. 
Ob mit dem Statut von Rom ein unabhängiger, unparteiischer und effektiv 
einsetzbarer Gerichtshof geschaffen wurde, bildet die zentrale Forschungsfrage. 
Weiters wird der Frage nachgegangen, wie die ablehnende Haltung der USA 
gegenüber diesem neuen Instrument begründet werden kann. Schlussendlich soll 
erläutert werden, inwiefern der ICC seine friedensfördernde Wirkung entfalten kann, 
und, davon ausgehend, ob auf diese Art und Weise grundsätzlich Frieden geschaffen 
werden kann. 
Nach einer kurzen Einführung zum Thema wird in Kapitel 2 eine Einführung in die 
Theorien der internationalen Beziehungen und eine Abhandlung des Wandels den 
Frieden als Stellenwert durchlaufen hat, vorgenommen. Die Verrechtlichung von 
Krieg wird als Teil der Einführung internationaler Normen in Form internationalen 
Rechts erläutert, gefolgt von theoretischen Grundlagen zum Verhältnis von Frieden 
und Gerechtigkeit. 
Die Entstehung von internationalem Strafrecht wird in Kapitel 3 geschildert und endet 
mit der Entstehung des ICC. Die kontroversesten Regelungen werden in Kapitel 4 
erläutert, unter anderem die Vorbehalte der USA gegen eine Mitgliedschaft. Diese 
umfassen die Auswirkungen auf Dritt-Staaten, die Rolle von Peacekeeping-Truppen 
und die Frage der Möglichkeiten, die im Hinblick auf Durchsetzungsmechanismen 
bestehen. Die problematische Tatsache des undefinierten Straftatbestandes des 
Verbrechens der Aggression wird ebenfalls behandelt. Aufgrund der hohen Brisanz 
wird in einem weiteren Unterkapitel ein Ausblick auf die zu erwartende Politik der 
USA unter dem neuen Präsidenten Obama gemacht. 
Das fünfte Kapitel widmet sich der Befriedungsfunktion des Internationalen 
Strafgerichtshofs. Anhand von vier konkreten Mechanismen, der Individualisierung 
von Täter- und Opfertum, der Rehabilitierung der Opfer, der Beendigung des 
Vergeltungskreislaufs und der Förderung von Konfliktkultur, sowie der 
Standardisierung von Konfliktlösung, werden die konkreten Auswirkungen von 
Internationaler Strafverfolgung auf ihre Durchführbarkeit analysiert. Als etwaige 
Alternative wird im Anschluss die Möglichkeit von Wahrheitskommissionen geprüft. 
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Abschließend wird festgestellt, dass es sich bei der Schaffung des Internationalen 
Strafgerichtshofs um ein Zeichen des Fortschritts im internationalen Denken in 
puncto verstärkter Kooperation auf internationaler Ebene handelt, deren konkrete 
Auswirkungen anfangs unter dem Optimum liegen werden.   
 107 
Abstract 
The debate on the ICC regarding its legitimacy and effectiveness in acting against 
grave breaches of human rights has been manifold. In this thesis, research is 
conducted based on the question of whether or not an independent, impartial and 
effectiv court has been established through the Statute of Rome. Further, the hostile 
attitude of the US towards the Court will be discussed in terms of the legitimacy of 
the arguments put forward. Finally, the peace promoting effects that are expected of 
international criminal prosecution are analysed regarding their probability and 
feasibilty. Moreover, the question of whether peace can even be established in such 
a manner is addressed. 
After a short introduction, Chapter 2 deals with the theoretical background to 
international relations and lays out a discourse of the transformation that peace as a 
value has undergone. A short history of the juridification of war in international law is 
then followed by theoretical considerations regarding the relation between peace and 
justice. 
The evolution of international criminal law and its temporary culmination in the 
establishment of the ICC is subject of Chapter 3. The most controversial provisions 
are depicted in Chapter 4, including the reservation of the USA regarding 
membership in the treaty. These involve the impacts on third-party states, the role of 
peacekeeping-troops, the problem of enforcement and the issue of the crime of 
aggression that has been left undefined. Further, an outlook on future relations 
between the ICC and the USA under president Obama is made. 
Finally, chapter 5 deals with the peace promoting effects of international criminal 
prosecution. On the basis of four mechanisms – individualization of guilt and the 
victims, rehabilitation of victims, closure of the cycle of retaliation and promotion of 
conflict culture, as well as standardization of conflict solving – the impacts of 
international criminal jurisdiction are analyzed regarding their feasibility and 
probability. In a short excursus Truth Commissions are analyzed as a possible 
alternative strategy. 
Ultimately, it is concluded that the creation of the ICC constitutes a symbol for 
progress in terms of enhanced cooperation on the international level, the effects of 
which will initially lie beneath the possible optimum. 
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